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 It is a June evening in the City of Light, and the sun is setting on the Rue du 
Faubourg Saint-Honore. As the last remaining customers in a posh boutique finish their 
browsing and stride toward the cashiers, a beleaguered saleswoman places a “closed” 
sign in the window. Meanwhile, other employees begin readying the facilities for a 
private shopping event that is to occur momentarily. Just then, a small group of American 
tourists approaches the front door, seeking admittance. The saleswoman refuses to let 
them in, insisting that the store is closed, notwithstanding the presence of customers 
inside. Harsh words are spoken, pleas for admittance are ignored, and the humiliated 
Americans eventually retreat to their hotel rooms clutching unspent Euros. 
 This episode, or something like it, surely occurs each day in Paris. It’s hardly 
news. But on the evening in question, the episode generated international headlines, and 
for good reason. The rebuffed tourists included Oprah Winfrey, one of America’s most 
famous, beloved, and wealthy women.1 Pundits debated whether race and national origin 
played a part in the saleswoman’s behavior, and argued over whether it was reasonable 
for Oprah and her entourage to request admittance after normal business hours. But lost 
in all the analysis was an important point: Nothing like this could have happened on 
Madison Avenue or Rodeo Drive.      
 In a few decades, the story of Oprah and the subsequently disciplined Parisian 
saleswoman will seem quaint. Reputation is becoming increasingly portable, and there is 
every reason to think that accurate assessments of our reputations and attributes will 
follow us from New York to Paris to Katmandu, such that Oprah will get the A-list 
treatment wherever she may go. Our cities and suburbs are increasingly going to 
resemble the small towns of lore, for better and worse. People who behave rudely in the 
presence of others will have a hard time hiding behind their anonymity or practical 
obscurity, and the fear of reputational sanctions will help keep us in line more often than 
not. Mistaken identity, judging books by their covers, con-jobs – all these pathologies 
resulting from asymmetric information will become increasingly rare, though the 
availability of personalized reputation information will generate new problems and 
challenges. This paper asks what the law should look like in a world of increasingly 
                                                 
1 Alessandra Stanley, The TV Watch: Oprah, No Diva She, Accepts Hermes Apology on the Air, N.Y. 
Times, Sep. 20, 2005, at B2.  
 3 of 82  
ubiquitous personal information. It examines how a fundamental change in information 
economics should alter the way we think about landlord-tenant, antidiscrimination, jury 
selection, prescription drug abuse, insurance, immigration, and consumer protection law. 
More provocatively, it advocates something that few academics and no privacy advocates 
presently favor – adopting government policies that will hasten the widespread 
availability of previously private consumer information in some contexts.   
 This paper completes a trilogy of projects theorizing the relationship between 
information and exclusion. In the first paper, I argued that in settings where real estate 
developers sought to exclude subpopulations from a community but were prohibited from 
doing so explicitly by law, they might achieve their exclusionary objective by bundling 
community membership with a costly collective amenity that would be unpalatable to 
most members of the targeted subpopulation.2 In the second paper, I developed a broader 
hypothesis about why a resource owner would opt for one exclusionary strategy over 
another – excluding through mechanisms based on trespass law when the owner had 
sufficient information about which prospective applicants were undesirable, and using 
non-trespass-based mechanisms, such as exclusionary language or bundling, when 
significant information asymmetries were present.3 In this paper, I examine a brave new 
world of radically diminishing information asymmetries and explain how that 
information shock will unsettle existing assumptions about law and public policy.4 
 Part I of this paper identifies a number of contexts in which the widespread 
availability of information about individuals can transform commercial and social 
interactions. It then suggests that in some of these settings it will be appropriate for the 
government to reduce to costs that decisionmakers face in obtaining relevant information 
about individuals, so that decisionmakers can rely more heavily on that relevant 
information and decrease their reliance on (less relevant but more easily observable) 
proxies, such as racial or ethnic status, gender, or age.  
 Part II identifies a number of pragmatic concerns that can help us determine when 
it is appropriate for the government to facilitate greater information flow. It suggests that, 
                                                 
2 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437 (2006).   
3 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835 
(2006). 
4 Predictably, the three papers are in the process of being integrated into a book, forthcoming with Yale 
University Press, tentatively titled A Theory of Information and Exclusion. 
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ceteris paribus, it is desirable for the government to promote the publication of 
information about individuals when rational discrimination is common, but irrational 
discrimination is uncommon. The Part then briefly explores the challenges posed by false 
feedback or other forms of misinformation, and differentiates between those settings 
where the government should itself publish previously private information, and those in 
which it should facilitate the aggregation or standardization of data that other parties have 
acquired or published. 
 Part III tackles a number of normative objections to the use of government 
information policy as a tool for tackling unlawful discrimination and other social ills. It 
notes that in some contexts, statistical discrimination must be tolerated, because society 
has determined that the information the decisionmaker would like to have is not 
information to which he ought to have access. It then discusses the distributive justice 
consequences of the information policy regime discussed herein, and explores whether 
information-based strategies for combating social ills. Finally, the part examines the 
desirability of living in a society where citizens’ conduct is frequently evaluated and 
those evaluations are made widely available, with a brief discussion of the emerging 
pertinent empirical literature. A brief conclusion follows.  
I. The Reputation Revolution and the Law 
 
 One of the most significant developments in the industrialized world during the 
last decade has been the increased availability of information about individuals. Personal 
information that was once obscure can be revealed almost instantaneously via a Google 
search. The flea market transaction, in which a consumer had to hope that a vendor was 
trustworthy, has been largely displaced by the eBay auction, where a prospective bidder 
can review information about hundreds of the seller’s prior transactions, in an effort to 
ensure that the seller is trustworthy, prompt, courteous, and the like. Anxious parents 
thinking about purchasing in an unfamiliar neighborhood can acquire information about 
all the registered sex offenders living nearby, complete with comprehensive information 
about their crimes, via a few keystrokes. Sizing up a potential blind date to get a sense of 
his peer group – a task that was once arduous and blatant – has now become easy and 
discreet, thanks to Facebook, Myspace, and similar social networking sites. A car seller 
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can comfortably show a consumer a new car and let her drive it home, having paid for the 
vehicle with little or no money down, thanks to the comprehensive and nearly 
instantaneous credit checks that now take place on the dealer’s lot. And we can even 
assess the credibility of people we have no expectation of ever meeting – the amateur 
movie critic on Netflix, the amateur book reviewer on Amazon, or the amateur 
commentator on Slashdot – I can look up their respective histories of movie, book, and 
article reviews, to see how seriously I should take their recent review of Ratatouille, A 
Thousand Splendid Suns, or a blog post reviewing the new iPod Nano. Reputation 
tracking technologies are being used to track customer’s preferences and quirks, too. For 
example, Open Table, the popular online reservations system for restaurants, tracks 
dining patron tendencies – If I repeatedly show up late for reservations, Open Table will 
alert restaurateurs so that they know to expect me fifteen minutes after my stated 
reservation time.5 In short, the anonymity and pseudonymity that once characterized our 
interactions with strangers is fading. I will refer to this change as the “reputation 
revolution.” 
 In the years ahead, it seems likely that existing imperfections in the reputation 
market will dissipate. For example, it is presently difficult for an individual to translate a 
strong offline reputation into a strong online reputation. eBay does not let users take their 
existing brick-and-mortar reputations into the online auction world. So, a well-established 
merchant in a small town with lots of satisfied customers providing her repeat business 
gets zero feedback points upon opening a new eBay account, just like everyone else. 
Because a strong feedback score permits a seller to obtain higher prices for sold goods, 6 
the new entrant on eBay thus may have to sell goods with a discounted reserve price in 
order to build up the positive reputation that will allow her to compete effectively with 
established online sellers. This is a significant market inefficiency, and it will be 
surprising if the market does not address it. More precisely, we might expect to see meta-
ranking sites that make reputation more readily transferable from one online forum to 
another, and between online and offline marketplaces. More radically, we might expect to 
                                                 
5 Katie Hafner, Service at Restaurants Changing Subtly with Online Information, N.Y. Times, June 18, 
2007, at C1.  
6 See, e.g., Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9 Exp. Econ. 
79, 80-81, 96 (2006). 
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see the emergence of services that track the reputations of individuals in comprehensive 
ways. Just as each American has a credit score that banks, lenders, landlords and others 
can access before determining whether and on what terms to do business with us, we can 
envision the emergence of “social credit scores,” where individuals’ personality traits are 
assessed, and translated into a profile that gauges trustworthiness, sociability, 
cooperativeness, and popularity based on data from a variety of online and offline 
resources. Such profiling already occurs – indeed, it is old news – in the online 
advertising realm.7  
 As technologies improve, the reputation revolution has to potential to alter not 
only considered judgments with obvious economic and social consequences, like the 
decision to purchase a car, buy a home, go on a date, or acquire a pair of Nikes. In these 
settings we would hope that the decisionmaker will conduct some research before 
electing a course of action. In the near future, it is plausible that information about 
individuals will seep into interactions where it is presently unavailable. Such interactions 
require split-second decisions, but technologies being developed for the mass market will 
enable us to take advantage of the reputation revolution anyway in making those 
decisions. A concrete example will be useful. 
 It is late at night, and an unaccompanied adult is walking home. There are no 
pedestrians or moving vehicles immediately visible, but a 24-hour pharmacy stands 
across the street. The adult suddenly sees a group of five male teenagers turn the corner. 
The teens are now walking directly toward the adult. Will the pedestrian cross the street, 
perhaps entering the pharmacy for a moment? The answer probably will depend on a 
series of proxies: What race are the teenagers? How are they dressed? How are they 
interacting with one another? In a split second, and with potentially high stakes, the first 
question may prove decisive in guiding the adult’s response to this situation. The adult 
may well cross the street out of caution, and then feel ashamed after receiving quizzical 
or bemused looks from the probably harmless teenagers. 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to 
Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1550-57 (2006); Lee Kovarsky, Note, Tolls on the 
Information Superhighway: Entitlement Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1037, 1042-47 
(2003); Brad Stone, Myspace to Discuss Efforts to Customize Ads, N.Y. Times, Sep. 18, 2007, at __. 
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 Given presently available technology, we have a hard time understanding the 
application of a strategy to give the pedestrian more relevant information so he can rely 
less on race or wardrobe information. But wearable computers that are already being 
tested and rolled out permit precisely those types of calculations. In the past few years, 
our old-school cell phones have seen the addition of cameras, text-messaging, email 
capabilities, global positioning system, and mp3 player functionalities. In a few more 
years, they are likely to integrate impressive social networking capabilities as well. 
Computer scientists have now spent a decade researching, implementing, and writing 
about wearable communities, which employ ubiquitous computing resources to help 
provide individuals with information about the people and products around them.8 These 
technologies have many functionalities, but among the most promising is an application 
of social networking sites like Myspace and Facebook into real space. In November of 
2007, Google announced that it was spearheading an effort to bring next generation social 
networking software applications to smart-phones, and that 33 other technology firms, 
including Motorola, Samsung, Sprint, T-Mobile, eBay, and Intel, had pledged to 
cooperate in that effort.9  
 If everyone is carrying around a wearable computer that can talk to everyone 
else’s wearable computer, then at a moment’s notice, I might be able to discern whether 
anyone else in a café has seen the movie I just saw.10 While waiting in line at the grocery 
store or box office, I might be alerted to the presence of a friend-of-a-friend just behind 
me. That functionality is something that existing web sites like Dodgeball.com already 
enable. And given those existing technologies, it is a short leap to a world in which 
having told my wearable computer that I am looking for an electrician, I might learn that 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE: THE DAWNING AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2006); 
Marije Kanis et al., Toward Wearable Social Networking with iBand, CHI Conference Late Breaking 
Results 1521 (2005); Gerd Kortuem & Zary Segall, Wearable Communities: Augmenting Social Networks 
with Wearable Computers, Pervasive Computing 11 (Jan.-Mar. 2003); Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance: 
Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 
Surveillance & Society 331 (2003); Michael Terry et al., Social Net: Using Patterns of Physical Proximity 
over Time to Infer Shared Interests, Extended Abstracts of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems 816 (2002).  For a technical overview about various wearable community projects, see 
Roy L. Ashok & Dharma P. Agrawal 36 IEEE Computer 31 (Nov. 2003). The primary legal treatment of 
this subject is Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff’s thoughtful article, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public 
Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005).   
9 Miguel Helft & John Markoff, Google Discloses Plans to Put a PC into Every Pocket, N.Y. Times, Nob. 
6, 2007, at C1. 
10 Kang & Cuff, supra note 8, at 131. 
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there is an available electrician in aisle six at Home Depot, that a trusted colleague 
employed the electrician recently and rated his performance 9 out of 10, and that the 
electrician has experience doing the sorts of lighting rewiring jobs that I need done.  
 These sorts of technologies can help us navigate the everyday snap judgments 
about how to interact with strangers on a mostly deserted block. My computer might tell 
me that the five youths approaching late at night are honors students or dropouts with 
long rap sheets.11 And if my computer can tell me that, a police officer’s wearable 
computer can tell him just as much, diminishing the likelihood of racial profiling and 
tragic mistakes.12 My computer could tell me whether the individual who just cut me off 
on the freeway has a history of violence and vehicular collisions, or is a surgeon likely 
racing to the hospital. Summary statistics, much like eBay’s reputation scores or 
Slashdot’s karma points, could flash on my screen, to tell me that the teens are 
trustworthy and trusted by people I trust, but that the driver is someone with a violent 
temper who is best avoided.  
 Of course, if it is late at night and I am being approached by teenagers with 
suspicious intentions, do I really want to be pulling out a portable computer and scanning 
at an eBay profile? If a taxi driver has to decide whether to pick up an African American 
pedestrian late at night, won’t statistical discrimination always be more palatable than 
spending ten seconds evaluating the pedestrian’s reputation score?  
 These are fair questions, but they are ones with comforting answers – the problem 
raised by these examples have already been addressed in e-commerce. In e-commerce, 
automated negotiation protocols allow users who own devices that can communicate with 
other users’ devices to set the parameters for such communication. For example, these 
                                                 
11 See Kang & Cuff, supra note 8, at 133-34; see also Mark A. Blythe et al., Little Brother: Could and 
Should Wearable Computing Technologies Be Applied to Reducing Older People’s Fear of Crime, 8 Pers. 
Ubiquitous Comput. 402, 407-12 (2004) (describing the potential for wearable computing technologies to 
address the information problems that underlie urban crime). 
12 The People’s Republic of China is beginning to use wearable computers and identity management 
systems to help the police keep track of the government’s contacts with its civilian population, as well as 
the citizenry’s movements through public spaces.  See Keith Bradsher, China Enacting a High-Tech Plan 
to Track People, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2007, at __.  Less disconcertingly, Maryland is developing the 
capacity for police officers to conduct criminal background checks via squad-car based terminals, as well 
as enabling biometric identification.  See Philip J. Weiser, Communicating During Emergencies: Toward 
Interoperability and Effective Information Management, 57 Fed. Comm. L.J. 547, 564 (2007). 
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protocols have been implemented in digital rights management, p3p systems,13 and 
wearable communities. In such environments, automated negotiation lets users specify 
what levels of trust are necessary before their digital media device will download content 
from another device or web site; they permit users to identify in advance what privacy-
protection characteristics a web site offers and only show users items for sale from web 
sites that meet the specified criteria; or they allow someone participating in a wearable 
community to request notification whenever someone else approaches whose wearable 
computer indicates specified attributes (unmarried, fellow Hoosier, Decembrists fan, 
etc.). Our hypothetical taxi driver might program his computer to notify him whenever a 
university student, nurse, or airline pilot seeking a cab is in the vicinity, but assign lower 
priority to taxi requests from those who are currently unemployed and provide an audible 
warning beep whenever a proximate convicted felon tries to hail a cab. Alternatively, the 
taxi driver might identify 50 cab drivers who he trusts, and pick up any passenger who 
had received positive feedback from any of those cab drivers.14  
 Under the law, of course, a taxi company is a common carrier, with an obligation 
to provide service to everyone.15 But let us not kid ourselves. Cab drivers routinely avoid 
picking up African Americans, often avoid serving African American neighborhoods 
entirely, and resist efforts to enforce antidiscrimination laws.16 As we will see shortly, 
information asymmetries currently cause taxi drivers to sort on the basis of race and 
gender when picking up rides, penalizing both the African American male gang member 
and the African American male clergyman. A technology that allows sorting between 
gang members and clergymen makes the world a better place than the one in which we 
live, where the only decisionmaking factors available to the cab driver are the 
information revealed by quick visual inspection (race, gender, dress, etc.). 
 To be sure, there are technological impediments and consumer preference 
impediments to the implementation of these technologies. Networking capabilities will 
                                                 
13 p3p stands for platform for privacy preferences. 
14 He might well decide to extend the circle of trust by one degree – trusting favorable feedback from any 
of his 50 cabbie friends, or any of his 50 cabbie friends’ friends – a community of interest that could well 
include many of the cab drivers in town.  
15 Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 Yale L.J. 1613, 1624 
(2005).   
16 See Danita L. Davis, Note, Taxi! Why Hailing a New Idea about Public Accommodation Laws May be 
Easier than Hailing a Taxi, 37 Val. U. L. Rev. 929 (2003). 
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have to improve somewhat, kinks will have to be worked out of the existing wearable 
computing operating software, and consumers will have to decide that the socialization 
gains from these technologies warrant the associated loss of privacy. No significant 
hypothesis in this paper depends on the successful implementation of each of these 
technologies. But the preceding discussion is designed to open the reader’s eyes to the 
dramatic nature of the reputation revolution that has already occurred in the past decade 
and the non-fanciful possibility that equally dramatic changes lie ahead in the next ten 
years.     
A. Existing Scholarship on Consumer Information and Discrimination 
 The rise of social networking web sites, consumer information databases, Internet 
blogs, and online feedback systems have not made scholars who write about privacy law 
happy. In a series of books and articles, these scholars have bemoaned the disappearance 
of anonymity, the loss of autonomy, and the dangers of shame sanctions that have 
accompanied these trends.17 One influential and important part of that critique began in 
1993 with Oscar Gandy’s book, The Panoptic Sort,18 and remains vibrant and visible 
today thanks to work by David Lyon and other surveillance studies scholars.19 According 
to Gandy and Lyon, the growth of technology-aided surveillance, consumer information 
databases, and other mechanisms for accessing increased information about individuals 
facilitates pernicious forms of discrimination – what Gandy calls “the panoptic sort” and 
Lyon calls “social sorting.” It prevents governments from treating citizens alike, and 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1373 (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 461 (2000); Oscar H. 
Gandy Jr., Quixotics Unite! Engaging the Pragmatists on Rational Discrimination, in Theorizing 
Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond 318 (David Lyon ed. 2006). Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, 
Databases, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 393 (2002); Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and 
Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.Com and Myspace.Com, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 95 (2006). 
18 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993). 
19 See, e.g., THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND (David Lyon ed. 2006); 
SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY , RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION (David Lyon ed. 
2003). 
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similarly prevents firms from treating consumers as an undifferentiated mass. As a result, 
people are categorized, grouped, divided, and treated in disturbingly differential ways.20   
 This paper argues that Gandy and Lyon misapprehend the relationship between 
discrimination and the availability of personal information. The increased availability of 
information about individuals will prompt some decisionmakers to shift from not sorting 
to sorting, as Gandy and Lyon argue. But it will prompt other decisionmakers to shift 
from sorting via problematic group-based stereotypes to less problematic, more 
individuated judgments. The key questions, as I explain below, are the magnitudes and 
social welfare consequences of the two relevant shifts.  
 Before the developed world made heavy investments in its reputational 
infrastructure,21 citizens and consumers were not treated equally. Governments sorted 
citizens and firms sorted consumers then, as now. The difference between our present age 
and prior epochs was not the temptation of sorting, but the basis for sorting. Lacking 
comprehensive consumer information databases, criminal history databases, Google 
searches, Myspace profiles, and the like, institutions interested in sorting used easily 
available criteria like race, gender, and age to sort Americans. When Gandy, Lyon, and 
other scholars writing in the surveillance studies tradition advocate greater privacy 
protections as a mechanism for decreasing discrimination, they (unwittingly) propose 
policies that will shift sorting techniques away from relatively unproblematic criteria like 
purchasing patterns, social affiliations, criminal histories, insolvency records, and 
Internet browsing behavior, back toward the old sorting standbys – race, gender, and age. 
Often, the choice is not between sorting and no-sorting; the economic and social gains 
from sorting are simply too great, and banning sorting in many contexts will be 
simultaneously costly and not terribly effective. Rather, the real choice is between sorting 
on the basis of uncomfortable criteria and sorting on the basis of obnoxious and 
distasteful criteria.  
 This section takes stock of the enormous changes that industrialized democracies 
have seen in the past couple of decades, and asks, in a systematic and sustained way, 
                                                 
20 See GANDY, supra note 18, at 71-93; David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and 
Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING, supra note 19, at 13, 13-28. 
21 Reputational infrastructure consists of the technologies that enable information about individuals’ actions 
and reputations to circulate efficiently among members of society. 
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what the law should do to respond to those changes. It explores how the widespread 
availability of information about individuals has already transformed the landlord tenant 
market, and then analyzes the law’s initial responses to this revolution in the context of 
employment discrimination, jury selection, medical treatment decisions, immigration law, 
consumer protection law, and the law of defamation. In all these settings, courts and 
policymakers are beginning to confront the new informational environment, but have not 
fully thought through its implications for legal doctrine and policy. The discussion 
illustrates that context matters, such that the law’s optimal response in one racial 
discrimination context – hiring – should differ from its response in another racial 
discrimination context – jury selection.  
B. Landlord-Tenant Law 
 Before looking forward it is always wise to look back. The reputation revolution 
transformed the landlord-tenant market long before it altered many other aspects of 
economic life. A brief case study will illustrate the basic trend that this paper describes: 
reliance on poor sorting proxies when accurate proxies are costly to obtain, a shift to 
reliance on those accurate proxies when the cost of obtaining high-quality information 
drops, and a myopic reaction by policymakers who failed to anticipate the consequences 
of the reputation revolution. Reforms designed to protect down-on-their-luck tenants 
from landlord abuses in the 1960’s have, ironically, relegated some current tenants to a 
reputational underclass, whose members have a hard time renting decent units even after 
achieving some measure of financial stability. But I am getting ahead of myself. Let us 
begin with an anecdote that underscores how freely circulating personal information 
affects the rental market. 
 During the 1970s and 1980s, it was not unusual for landlords in New York City to 
refuse to rent apartments to lawyers.22 At first blush, this seems like an odd trend. Us 
lawyers may be loathed by the public, but we typically bring home a nice paycheck. A 
New York City landlord who refused to rent to lawyers would be depriving himself of 
many prospective, well-heeled tenants. The explanation for this seemingly irrational 
landlord conduct was a proxy story. As one landlord explained to a New York court, his 
                                                 
22 See JESSIE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 382 (6th ed. 2006) and sources cited therein. 
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refusal to rent an apartment to a qualified attorney applicant was based on his preference 
for “a person who was likely to be less informed and more passive” rather than someone 
“attuned to her legal rights.”23 That court noted that lawyers were not a protected class 
under fair housing laws, and therefore ruled in the landlord’s favor.24 It took nine years, 
but New York City eventually prohibited discrimination in the housing market on the 
basis of profession, at the urging of lawyers who had similar troubles finding rental units 
in the city.25 
 The 1986 enactment of New York City’s profession-based fair housing 
protections did not prompt the city’s landlords to wave the white flag on tenant screening. 
Landlords still wanted to screen out those tenants who seemed likely to invoke their 
rights under New York’s landlord-tenant laws. Some landlords responded by continuing 
to avoid renting to lawyers, but offering instead some pretext – new or old.26 But other 
landlords stopped relying on profession-as-a-proxy, and started relying on involvement in 
prior litigation as a proxy for litigiousness. Information brokers began data-mining state 
and municipal court records, hoping to identify tenants who had been involved in 
landlord-tenant litigation of any sort.27 Tenants who have gotten themselves involved in 
such litigation were essentially blacklisted by those landlords.28 In such a world, even 
tenants who had won suits against their landlords face a difficult time obtaining housing. 
As the founder of a tenant screening company told the New York Times, “It is the policy 
of 99 percent of our customers in New York to flat out reject anybody with a landlord-
tenant record, no matter what the reason is and no matter what the outcome is, because if 
their dispute has escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain.”29 In 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Kramarsky v. Stahl Mgmt, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943, 944-45 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
24 Id. at 945. 
25 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 22, at 382-83. 
26 A 2006 New York Times article mentions continuing discrimination in New York City against “lawyers 
(too litigious) and musicians (too loud).”  Teri Karush Rogers, Only the Strongest Survive, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 26, 2006, at 1. 
27 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 277 (1991); Mary B. 
Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE 
L. REV. 135, 181-82 (2000). 
28 Rogers, supra note 26, at 1. 
29 Id. 
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New York, at least, even sex offenders seem to have an easier time finding a place to 
live.30  
 On one account tenant screening services are popular in New York precisely 
because landlord-tenant regulations in that city slant so heavily in the direction of 
tenants.31 Faced with high eviction and litigation costs, landlords devote more resources 
to trying to screen out prospective tenants who pose heightened risks of future legal 
entanglements. This screening presents a social problem, because society has an interest 
in ensuring that the landlord-tenant laws are enforced, and the common law system 
requires the help of plaintiffs who generate appellate cases, the resolution of which will 
clarify the law.32 Landlord-tenant law, as it exists in ordinances and case law, bears little 
resemblance to the set of rules that govern every day relations between landlords and 
tenants. The reputational consequences of involvement in litigation are so severe that a 
rational tenant should often elect not to seek enforcement of the substantive entitlements 
provided by formal law. In this environment, it is safe to wonder whether landlord-tenant 
clinics should even exist in their current form. Shouldn’t a legal aid attorney advise an 
indigent client that involvement in landlord-tenant litigation is likely to be 
counterproductive in the long run? Pro-tenant regulations, in short, might not make 
tenants better off, though they do seem to improve the lot of tenant screening firms.  
 This dynamic explains why some of the landlord-tenant reforms of the 1960s and 
1970s, which were supported by well-meaning tenants’ rights advocates, may have 
ultimately backfired. One such reform is the prohibition on self-help evictions by 
landlords and tenants. At common law, landlords were able to evict tenants who had 
violated the terms of their lease, provided that the landlords did not use excessive or 
unreasonable force.33 Beginning in the 1960s, a legal reform effort was begun by tenant 
advocates who argued that legal process should be the exclusive means of ousting a 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect Public 
Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1350, 1363-64 (2007). 
33 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 22, at 408; Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion into New York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 315, 328-29 (2000). 
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tenant in possession.34 That reform movement was premised on the view that self-help 
evictions tend to spark violence between the landlord and tenant, and that unless checked 
by the courts, some landlords would evict tenants who had a legal right to remain on the 
premises.35 Although some states still permit self-help by landlords, their ranks have been 
shrinking, and even the jurisdictions that permit landlords to use reasonable force in self-
help evictions have defined “reasonable force” so narrowly that self help has become a 
“theoretical but not a practical alternative.”36 
 The movement to prohibit self-help evictions by landlords has long had a few 
critics, with the most prominent ones suggesting that landlords would pass the high costs 
of judicially evicting deadbeat tenants onto the tenants who paid their bills on time.37 
Some passing on of these costs undoubtedly occurs, but the reputation revolution 
suggests a deeper criticism of the prohibitions on landlord self help. Eviction via self help 
typically creates no public records. Courts are not involved in a self-help eviction, and a 
landlord has no economic incentive to report such a dispossession to a credit bureau or 
any other information broker.38 Evictions via summary proceedings, on the other hand, 
necessarily generate public records, and it is those public records that will prove so 
damaging to a tenant the next time he or she tries to rent an apartment. From the 
perspective of facilitating tenant rehabilitation and second chances, a law prohibiting self 
help by landlords will prove counterproductive. Many tenants who have trouble making 
rent payments will fail to appreciate the reputational repercussions of involvement in 
summary proceedings. For these tenants, the law’s prohibition on self help can be a 
particularly raw deal. This is a point overlooked by defenders of the prohibition on self-
help.39 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and 
Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85, 104 (2002). 
35 See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978). 
36 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 22, at 408. 
37 See, e.g., James J. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. 
L. Rev. 503, 522-24 (making this argument in the context of chattel property); cf. Chicago Board of 
Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that legal reforms 
designed to help tenants are often counterproductive for this reason).  
38 Indeed, assuming the absence of repeat-player interactions among landlords, the landlord may have an 
incentive to suppress information about a self-help eviction, so as to inflict an undesirable tenant on 
competitors. 
39 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 
326, 381-83 (2006). 
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 Tenants’ rights advocates who appreciate the ways in which earlier reforms have 
produced unintended consequences are not powerless to address this situation. If society 
believes that second chances are important in the landlord-tenant context, then it might 
require that information about involvement in landlord-tenant litigation be purged from 
consumers’ credit reports after a relatively brief period of time. Currently, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act requires that information about someone’s involvement in landlord-tenant 
litigation be removed from his credit report after seven years.40 But a seven-year cloud on 
one’s suitability as a tenant will still impose substantial harms on tenants who become 
involved in litigation. During the 1990s, California tried to address this broader concern 
legislatively, prohibiting credit reporting agencies from including information about a 
tenant’s involvement in landlord-tenant litigation where the tenant was the prevailing 
party. Alas, this legislation was invalidated by the courts on First Amendment grounds.41 
In short, legislators cannot easily prevent landlords from receiving information about 
tenants’ prior involvement in litigation. They can try to ban landlords from acting on that 
information, but the enforcement of such prohibitions, like the enforcement of other anti-
discrimination provisions that regulate decisionmakers’ behavior, will be spotty, 
expensive, and prone to false positives. 
 Let us survey landlord-tenant law in the twenty-first century. Tenant background 
checks have gotten so cheap that for many tenants, involvement in litigation of any sort 
will place meaningful constraints on their future ability to obtain rental housing. These 
tenants’ apartment search costs will be very high, since landlords do not advertise their 
unwillingness to rent to people who have previously been involved in litigation. 
Assuming non-trivial vacancy levels, some landlords will be willing to rent to those who 
have been evicted in summary proceedings or sought to vindicate their legal rights, but 
only after extracting higher rents and security deposits. In such a world, the only tenants 
who should be willing to defend their rights in court are those who have previously 
                                                 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000). 
41 See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1995), holding reaffirmed by U.D. 
Registry, Inc. v. State, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 647, 667 (Ct. App. 2006).  The latter U.D. Registry court 
nevertheless upheld California’s similar “security freeze” legislation.  Its basis for distinguishing the two 
cases was entirely unconvincing – the idea that preventing identity theft is a compelling government 
interest, but ensuring that tenants are able to exercise their rights under the law without fear of subsequent 
discrimination in the housing market is not a compelling interest.  50 Cal. Rptr.3d at 667. 
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litigated and those with the ability to purchase housing. It seems like a hopeless world for 
a tenants’ rights advocate. But such an advocate should not lose all hope. 
 There are two sides to every reputational coin, and that is equally true of this 
particular doubloon. Just as a substantial market has developed for tenant screening 
services, the market has also produced clearinghouses for information about landlords’ 
reputation. In a prior era, these were confined mainly to university housing offices, where 
students could swap stories about the good, bad, and ugly landlords.42 And in markets 
where prospective tenants often hire brokers to assist in their searches, brokers who 
depend on repeat business and positive word of mouth will have an incentive to learn 
which landlords behave inappropriately. Not surprisingly, the Internet has given rise to 
far more sophisticated resources for tenants. The most encouraging among them is 
Apartmentratings.com, a web site that contains tens of thousands of landlord ratings, 
written by current and former tenants. This and some similar web sites provide a wealth 
of information that would not easily be discerned in their absence, and their existence 
gives tenants some recourse in dealing with recalcitrant or bullying landlords.43 To the 
extent that web sites like these are used by prospective tenants, landlords should fear 
developing a reputation for unfair or overly aggressive behavior. The best check on 
landlord misbehavior is probably not the threat of a lawsuit by the tenant, but the threat of 
a series of complaints by aggrieved and eloquent tenants. 
 At present, an information asymmetry exists. Apartmentratings.com is not as 
extensive or reliable as web sites that monitor hotels and restaurants, like 
tripadvisor.com. Impressionistic evidence suggests that it is underutilized, and that the 
web site devotes fewer resources than tripadvisor does to ensuring that actual tenants (as 
opposed to landlords and their kin) are responsible for the reviews that appear therein. 
But as landlord-tenant law recedes into the background, we can expect that the demand 
for services like apartmentratings.com will expand, and this added demand will induce 
Apartmentratings.com to provide a better service or be driven out by competitors offering 
a superior product.  
                                                 
42 Ellickson, supra note 27, at 277. 
43 Similar websites that deal with the purchase of real estate, like Curbed’s New York, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles sites, are transforming the market for homes.  See Brad Reagan, The Dirt on the Neighbors, 
Smart Money 110-113 (Oct. 2007). 
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 Summarizing the landlord-tenant market, then, we see themes playing out that 
will become familiar refrains as you proceed through this paper. Where information costs 
are high, landlords will use rough proxies, like occupation, to sort out litigious or 
otherwise undesirable prospective tenants. As reputational information becomes far more 
widely available through commercial data brokers, landlords reduce their reliance on 
these proxies and begin blacklisting those prospective tenants with previous involvement 
in litigation. As a result of this transformation, landlord-tenant reforms designed to help 
tenants and constrain landlords have actually had the opposite effect, creating far more 
extensive public records of litigation that have tarred some tenants with undesirable 
status. In the short term, the result is tenant litigants being surprised by the reputational 
implications of trying to vindicate their rights through legal process. In the long run the 
effect will be a substantial deterrent to litigation in the landlord-tenant arena. This de-
emphasis on litigation may be tolerable, however, if existing resources designed to track 
and monitor landlords’ reputations become more reliable and widely used.   
C. Antidiscrimination Law  
 There are two basic forms of discrimination: animus-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination. Animus-based discrimination occurs when an individual treats 
members of a group differently because of (conscious or unconscious) antipathy toward 
that group. Statistical discrimination arises occurs when an individual treats members of a 
group differently because he believes that group membership correlates with some 
attribute that is both relevant and more difficult to observe than group membership.44 
Someone engaged in statistical discrimination would not harbor any ill will toward 
members of the group against which he is discriminating, beyond the belief that 
membership in that group correlates with some undesirable characteristic. To continue 
with our first example, a landlord who refuses to rent to lawyers because he fears litigious 
tenants and thinks lawyers are more likely to be litigious is engaging in statistical 
                                                 
44 See Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 228 (1986); David S. 
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical 
Standards, 79 Geo. L.J.  1619, 1622-24, 1626-30, 1639-43 (1991).  Richard Epstein analyzes statistical 
discrimination as a predictable response to information asymmetries in the labor market.  RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 32-40 (1992). 
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discrimination. A landlord who will not rent to lawyers because he hates lawyers is an 
animus-based discriminator. 
 Statistical discrimination is a likely explanation for instances in which 
decisionmakers who themselves belong to a minority group nevertheless make decisions 
that favor majority group members over minority group members. For example, recent 
newspaper accounts suggest that nannies generally prefer to work for Caucasian clients 
over African American clients. African American clients were widely seen as being too 
demanding, living in unsafe neighborhoods, or unable to pay as much as white couples.45 
These stereotypes were shared by nannies of all races, including African-Americans and 
Caribbeans.46 Similar phenomena have been used to explain the difficulties that African 
American professionals have hailing cabs successfully – African American riders are 
viewed as less safe passengers and poorer tippers.47 Waiters similarly perceive African 
Americans as poor tippers, an expectation that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if 
African Americans receive less attentive service as a result.48 Even doctors seem to rely 
on race-based statistical discrimination in diagnosing various ailments.49 
 There will be some contexts in which animus-based discrimination predominates 
and others in which statistical discrimination predominates. In 2007, overt racial animus 
persists but is probably waning as a result of generational replacement. A younger 
generation of Americans has embraced Martin Luther King and feels embarrassed by 
slavery, Jim Crow, and massive resistance to integration. To them, racial animus seems 
distasteful and passé. That said, implicit bias, an unconscious form of animus-based 
discrimination, is alive and well. Painting with broad brushstrokes, it appears that implicit 
bias and statistical discrimination are more prevalent today than they were in prior eras, 
and that overt animus-based discrimination is less prevalent.50  
                                                 
45 Jodi Kantor, Nanny Hunt Can Be a Slap in the Face for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at 1. 
46 Id. 
47 On taxi tipping, see Ayres et al., supra note 15, at 1648-53.   
48 Michael Lynn, Ethnic Differences in Tipping, 45 Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Admin. Q. 12 (2004). 
49 See Ana I. Balsa et al.,  Testing for Statistical Discrimination in Health Care, 40 Health Serv. Res. 227, 
247 (2005) (finding evidence consistent with statistical discrimination in diagnosing hypertension and 
diabetes). 
50 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias 1-2, forthcoming in BEHAVIORAL 
ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION.  For a discussion of the decline of overt discrimination, and 
the rise of statistical discrimination and implicit bias, see generally Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened 
to Racism?, 79 St. John’s L. Rev. 899 (2005). 
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 To illustrate how statistical discrimination plays out in contemporary society, 
suppose a person charged with hiring a sales clerk wants to avoid employing someone 
with a criminal background. Assuming the decisionmaker lacks reliable access to 
information about applicants’ criminal records, he might choose to hire a Caucasian 
female over an equally qualified African American male, based on the relatively high 
percentage of African American males and the relatively low percentage of Caucasian 
females who are involved in the criminal justice system.51 This decisionmaking process 
will impose a distasteful form of collective punishment on African American males who 
have had no run-ins with the law, penalizing them for crimes that others have committed. 
Because many decisionmakers may exercise the same decisionmaking criteria, a law-
abiding African American male may face repeated rejection and economic 
marginalization.52 For these reasons, antidiscrimination law prohibits the use of these 
race or gender proxies even where race or gender might correlate with some relevant 
qualification.53 
 Policing statistical discrimination through traditional antidiscrimination measures 
has proven difficult: many victims of statistical discrimination never bring suit, many 
non-victims bring unmeritorious suits that prompt defendants to settle so as to avoid the 
costs of litigation, and enforcement of the laws by the Justice Department and state 
attorneys general has been sporadic.54 Concerned about the courts being flooded with 
frivolous claims, judges have imposed substantial burdens on plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
                                                 
51 See Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 Crime & Justice 201, 201-03 
(1997); see also Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class 
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 Am. Soc. Rev. 151, 156 (2004) (noting that African American males 
face a lifetime risk of incarceration of 28.5% versus 4.4% for Caucasian males). 
52 Strauss, supra note 44, at 1626-29. 
53 See Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1085 n.15 (1983) (“For some jobs, however, there may be relevant skills that cannot be 
identified by testing. Yet Title VII clearly would not permit use of race, national origin, sex, or religion as a 
proxy for such an employment qualification, regardless of whether a statistical correlation could be 
established.”); Strauss, supra note 44, at 1623. 
54 See, e.g., Robert A. Kearny, The Coming Rise of Disparate Impact Theory, 110 Penn State L. Rev. 69, 86 
(2006); Stephen L. Ross & John Yinger, Uncovering Discrimination: A Comparison of the Methods Used 
by Scholars and Civil Rights Enforcement Officials, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 562 (2006); Michael Selmi, 
Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 
1401 (1998). 
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antidiscrimination laws, often hamstringing discovery, interpreting statutes of limitations 
aggressively, or hastening resolution of claims on summary judgment.55  
 A fascinating recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics by Holzer, 
Raphael, and Stoll illustrates the prevalence of statistical discrimination and the failure of 
antidiscrimination laws to curtail it.56 The paper began by noting that 28 percent of 
African American males, 16 percent of Hispanic males, and 4 percent of white males 
would be incarcerated at some point in their lives, and that the median prison sentence 
was less than 2 years.57 As a result, Holzer and co-authors observed that a sizable 
minority of the male labor pool in the United States consists of people with criminal 
records.58 The study then surveyed employers about their most recent hire for a position 
that did not require a college degree.59 The authors collected demographic information 
about each firm’s most recent hire and information about the firm’s willingness to hire 
employees with criminal records generally.  
 The findings of the study suggested that statistical discrimination against African 
Americans males is widespread, and that employers were using race as a proxy for 
involvement in the criminal justice system. Employers who conducted criminal 
background checks on applicants were 8.4% more likely to hire African Americans than 
employers who did not. Consistent with the statistical discrimination hypothesis, the 
effect was highly significant for employers who expressed unwillingness to hire ex-
offenders (10.7% greater likelihood) and only marginally significant for employers who 
stated their willingness to hire ex-offenders (4.8% greater likelihood.)60  The effects for 
African American males were far greater than the effects for African American females,61 
                                                 
55 See, e.g. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (construing the time limit for 
filing employment discrimination claims with the EEOC narrowly); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 
329, 338-339, (2d Cir. 2000); (holding that despite potential disparate impact, law enforcement stopping 
suspects on the basis of gender and race did not violate equal protection absent evidence of discriminatory 
racial animus). Matt Graves, Note, Purchasing While Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the 
Marketplace, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 159, 185 (2001) 
56 Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring 
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & Econ. 451 (2006). 
57 Id. at 451. 
58 Id.; see also Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am. J. Soc. 937, 938 (2003) (noting that 
approximately 8% of the working-aged population of the United States are ex-felons). 
59 Holzer et al., supra note 56, at 464. 
60 Id. at 464-65. 
61 Id. at 465-66, 470-71. 
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which is consistent with the statistical discrimination hypothesis and harder to square 
with a racial animus hypothesis. Further, the study found the same effects even after 
controlling for differences in the racial composition of the applicant pool.62 The study 
also found evidence that surveyed employers who do not conduct criminal background 
checks used other proxies for criminal convictions as well, including spotty work history 
and being unemployed for more than a year, and that those employers who expressed 
unwillingness to hire ex-offenders were significantly less likely to hire members of these 
stigmatized groups as well.63 
 Surveying their results, the study authors reached the following conclusion about 
the effects of statistical discrimination on African American job applicants: 
[T]he empirical estimates indicate that employers who perform criminal 
background checks are more likely to hire black applicants than employers 
that do not. . . . [T]his positive net effect indicates that the adverse 
consequences of employer-initiated background checks on the likelihood 
of hiring African Americans is more than offset by the positive effect of 
eliminating statistical discrimination. . . .  
 In addition, we find that the positive effect of criminal background 
checks on the likelihood that an employer hires a black applicant is larger 
among firms that are unwilling to hire ex-offenders. This pattern is 
consistent with the proposition that employers with a particularly strong 
aversion to ex-offenders may be more likely to overestimate the 
relationship between criminality and race and hence hire too few African 
Americans as a result. . . .  
 The results of this study suggest that curtailing access to criminal 
history records may actually harm more people than it helps and aggravate 
racial differences in labor market outcomes.64 
The implications of the study and of similar studies on the employment market,65 are 
chilling, but they should not be surprising. Many employers wish to avoid hiring ex-
offenders because they consider them untrustworthy, because they are worried about 
                                                 
62 Id. at 474. 
63 Id. at 472. 
64 Id. at 474. One of the authors of this study recently hedged this conclusion somewhat, noting that the 
desirability of promoting access to criminal records would depend on the amount of time for which a prior 
conviction would act as a reliable proxy for future conduct, and the degree of nuance in employer reactions 
to prior convictions. Steven Raphael, Should Criminal History Records Be Universally Available?, 5 
Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 512, 516-17, 519-20 (2006). 
65 See, e.g., David Autor & David Scarborough, Will Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from 
the Retail Sector, __ Q.J. Econ. ___ (forthcoming 2007); Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of 
Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J. Contemp. Crim. Justice 276 (2004);  Pager, 
supra note 58, at 937. 
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vicarious liability, or for other reasons.66 Employers who expend resources on criminal 
background checks will be able to sort effectively among those African Americans who 
have had run-ins with law enforcement and those who have not, but other employers will 
rely on race as a proxy for criminality, imposing a distasteful sanction on law-abiding 
African American males.67    
 Given the deleterious consequences of this predictable behavior it is worth 
examining the possible avenues, other than ex-post litigation, for the state to prevent 
statistical discrimination. One way to protect African Americans and other disadvantaged 
groups would be to make them appear indistinguishable from whites. Indeed, some 
efforts to reform antidiscrimination law have suggested that statistical discrimination can 
be mitigated if the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of information about a 
candidates’ race, religion, or gender.68 With less information, decisionmakers presumably 
will focus more on the black and white of a job applicant’s resume, and less on the black 
or white of the applicant’s skin. Related efforts, such as the Racial Privacy Initiative that 
was defeated at the polls in California in 2003, ostensibly sought to decrease racial 
discrimination by prohibiting the government from collecting information about 
individuals’ race, so that the government could not disseminate that information or act 
upon it at a later date.69 
 In an era of ubiquitous personal information, we should consider approaching the 
statistical discrimination problem from the opposite direction: using the government to 
help provide decisionmakers with something that approximates complete information 
                                                 
66 Holzer et al., supra note 56, at 453. 
67 The pathology described in the text is not the only rational but socially undesirable employer reaction to 
asymmetric information.  Faced with unreliable information about criminal history, an employer may lean 
more heavily on word-of-mouth from existing social networks in its efforts to hire trustworthy employees.  
Cf. George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. Legal Stud. 623, 632-33 
(1980) (“The more costly the acquisition of knowledge, the more expensive it becomes to enter into 
transactions with new parties.  We should expect less mobility of laborers, creditors, etc.”).  Because the 
social networks used for job search purposes tend to be racially segregated, see Antoni Calvo-Armengol & 
Matthew O. Jackson, The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality, 94 Amer. Econ. Rev. 
426 (2004), increased reliance on word-of-mouth by firms that presently employ few minorities will 
increase the likelihood that minorities will continue to be underrepresented in that workplace in the future.  
68 See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 14-16 (2000) (discussing orchestral auditions, in which a screen separates the judges from the 
auditioning musician); cf. Kleysteuber, supra note 32, at 1350-1352 (proposing that the government try to 
limit landlords’ access to information regarding tenants’ prior involvement in landlord-tenant litigation). 
69 For an interesting discussion and critique of this initiative, see Anita L. Allen, Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 
Fordham L. Rev. 1677, 1686-96 (2004). 
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about each applicant, so that readily discernable facts like race or gender will not be 
overemphasized and more obscure but relevant facts, like past job performance or social 
capital, will loom larger. For instance, government subsidies could promote the creation 
of employment evaluation clearinghouses, where individuals’ employment reviews from 
all prior jobs would be aggregated in a single source that would be accessible to human 
resources personnel. The government might further improve the quality of the data in 
these clearinghouses by providing tax subsidies to encourage the collection of “360 
degree” feedback within firms, a policy that is likely to decrease the weight associated 
with any particular evaluation and minimize the likelihood that race- or gender- dynamics 
will taint the accuracy of the employee evaluations.70 Further, the state could publish 
information about all individuals’ involvement (or lack thereof) in the criminal justice or 
bankruptcy systems; it might publish military records that document individuals’ 
performance and conduct while in the service; or it might verify and vouch for 
applicant’s educational credentials.71 
 On this theory, a major factor driving unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnic status, gender, or religion is a lack of verifiable information about the 
individual seeking a job, home, or service. By making the publication of criminal 
histories tortious72 or raising the media’s costs of obtaining aggregated criminal history 
                                                 
70 See Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy: A Full-Circle 
Approach, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 117, 117-18 (2002). 
71 Richard Epstein notes in passing the desirability of such efforts, and complains that antidiscrimination 
law sometimes thwarts them.  Epstein, supra note 44, at 40 (“The strategy of law should be to encourage 
employers to obtain as much individual information as possible about workers so that they can, pro tanto, 
place less reliance on broad statistical judgments.  To the extent, therefore, that the present 
antidiscrimination law imposes enormous restrictions on the use of testing, interviews, and indeed any 
information that does not perfectly individuate workers, then by indirection it encourages the very sorts of 
discrimination that the law seeks to oppose.”).  In addition to developing Epstein’s insight in far more 
detail, my analysis differs from his in two important respects.  First, I identify ways in which the 
government can now affirmatively gather and publish information about individuals as a means of 
combating statistical discrimination.  Second, whereas Epstein favors the repeal of antidiscrimination laws, 
see id. at 3, I support their continued enforcement, but view government information policy as a useful 
supplement to them.  See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1889-94; cf. Strauss, supra note 44, at 1641-42 
(“[S]tatistical discrimination can be reduced if employers are provided with reliable information about 
employees.  This should be a principal objective of any regulatory regime in this area.  Ordinarily, one 
excellent way to learn about an employer’s qualifications is to hire him or her.”). 
72 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931). 
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information that is already in the government’s hands,73 information privacy protections 
become the enemy of antidiscrimination law. The tradeoff makes privacy law and 
institutional arrangements that obscure information about individual’s reputations far 
more problematic than courts and theorists presently suppose. 
D. Jury Selection 
 The same sorts of dynamics that confront decisionmakers in the hiring, leasing, 
and sales contexts play out within the criminal justice system as well. The relatively few 
high-stakes legal disputes that go to trial are often won or lost during the voir dire 
process, when attorneys seek to seat the jurors deemed most sympathetic to the sorts of 
arguments they will make and strike those deemed least sympathetic. Here, as in other 
contexts, the relevant decisionmakers appear to rely heavily on characteristics that they 
can discern at a relatively low cost – race, gender, age, and national origin.74 They also 
rely on additional information that the jurors themselves provide, but there are significant 
problems with taking that information at face value. First, the prospective jurors often 
knowingly provide inaccurate information.75 Second, the jurors may be poor at self-
assessing. For example, they may overestimate their ability to be impartial in light of 
relevant life experiences. Third, there are lots of questions that attorneys would love to 
know the answer to, but that they do not dare ask jurors. In some cases, lines of juror 
questioning are placed off limits by the law, as is usually the case with prospective jurors’ 
voting records, medical conditions, or reading habits.76 In other instances, attorneys fear 
antagonizing prospective jurors by asking them questions deemed overly intrusive.  
                                                 
73 See, e.g., United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989) (holding that criminal rap sheets are exempt from disclosure under FOIA because their 
dissemination would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).  
74 Even after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky made it clear that race could not provide a 
basis for the use of peremptory strikes, some attorneys continued to do so, and upon opposing counsel’s 
raising of a Batson challenge, they admitted to having stricken prospective jurors on the basis of race, 
provided no explanation for their use of the peremptory, or claimed to be striking jurors on the basis of a 
purportedly non-race-based criteria, like “NAACP members” or people “likely to be offended by racist 
jokes contained in the evidence.”  Kenneth Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About 
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 480-83 (1996). 
75 Herald P. Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A Primer on Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 Law 
& Contem. Problems 116, 117-18 (1980). 
76 Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age, Part II: Juror Investigation on the 
Internet – Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 2 Sedona Conf. J. 211, 216 (2001). 
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 Attorneys have imperfect information about prospective jurors, and what 
attorneys do not know about jurors may prove decisive in deliberations. Yet attorney 
folklore about what observable characteristics affect juror decisionmaking is often 
unreliable and unscientific.77 In recent years, a large industry of jury consultants has 
sprung up, hoping to make jury selection less of an art and more of a science.78 The jury 
consultant’s job is to take information that is available from jury questionnaires and voir 
dire, and use it to predict a prospective juror’s behavior. Thus, jury consultants may try to 
read body language, analyze handwriting, suggest revealing voir dire questions, or 
provide lawyers with information about how members of various demographic groups 
behave as jurors.79 To a jury consultant, the observable and trivial detail is often a proxy 
for the unobservable and critical characteristic.80 But a large part of what modern jury 
consultants now provide to their clients is even more fine-grained. Jury consultants 
increasingly run background checks on the various prospective jurors in the pool, pulling 
credit reports, employing search engines, looking for rap sheets, and examining property 
tax records.81 In some cases, jury consultants work with private investigators who 
photograph prospective jurors’ homes and vehicles, searching for any pertinent 
information, like a political yard sign or a religious bumper sticker.82 What’s more, jury 
surveillance is beginning to resemble a two-way street. Empanelled jurors are Googling 
the attorneys who are making arguments before them with increasing regularity, and trial 
lawyers are trying to make their web profiles as appealing as possible to these curious 
jurors.83  
                                                 
77 Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore 
and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 229, 229-38 (1990). 
78 See NEIL J. KRESSEL & DORIT KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING 
(2002). 
79 Franklin Stier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, 
Its Impact on Trial Justice, and What, if Anything, to Do About It, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 441, 466-67; see also 
Fahringer, supra note 75, at 127 (“Jurors usually stand out because of their apparent unfamiliarity with the 
courthouse.  Watch what they do and try to remember their faces.  Note what they say in the lobby of the 
courthouse, how they behave, what newspapers they buy; these activities will reveal in a small way what 
they are like.  When the jury panel is brought into the courtroom, study them.  Search for clues that may be 
helpful in making important choices.  A Wall Street Journal tucked under an arm, a sexy paperback book 
protruding from a purse, or a best-seller in a jurors hands can be meaningful.”). 
80 See, e.g., Fahringer, supra note 75, at 132-33. 
81 Redgrave & Stover, supra note 76, at 219. 
82 Id. at 213. 
83 “Should You Design Your Firm’s  Web Site with Jurors in Mind?” from law.com 1-2-2007. 
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 In what may be the beginning of an emerging trend, courts are examining the 
backgrounds of jurors on their own initiative, rather than relying on the parties to do the 
digging. Interest in this practice is particularly strong in Illinois, where the high-profile 
corruption conviction of a former Governor was thought vulnerable on appeal thanks to 
the dismissal of two jurors eight days into the deliberations.84 The jurors were dismissed 
after Chicago Tribune reporters discovered that they had each concealed arrest records 
during the jury selection process.85 To help prevent a repetition of these problems, the 
Chief Judge of the Northern District of Illinois has instructed court personnel to conduct 
criminal background checks on all prospective jurors in high profile cases.86 If the Illinois 
experience proves successful, then one can imagine its duplication and expansion in other 
jurisdictions. 
 What should we make of the Northern District’s reforms? Although criminal and 
other background checks are increasingly relied upon by litigators in high-stakes trials, 
not all parties employ them, and the George Ryan trial suggests that prosecutors 
sometimes fail to do their homework on prospective jurors. In the case of criminal 
records, the state is in the best position to aggregate the information and use it to remove 
citizens with felony convictions from the jury pool ex ante, or provide the litigants with 
this information as a matter of course, so that they can do with it what they want. Indeed, 
the Ryan trial may be somewhat of an outlier in light of the many resources devoted to 
the former Governor’s defense by a large Chicago law firm. In the typical criminal case, 
prosecutors may have better access to criminal history databases than public or court-
appointed defense counsel, and having the courts collect and disseminate this information 
will prevent troubling asymmetries from arising in the criminal justice system. Thus, on 
the whole, getting the courts more involved in collecting this information seems like a 
good thing. 
 That said, we cannot evaluate the Northern District reform without some recourse 
to first principles. We must decide whether the jury system is an effort to increase 
                                                 
84 Matt O’Connor, Jury Pools Can Face Probes in Sensitive Trials: Ryan Case Sparks Move to Avoid Bias, 
Scandal, Chi. Trib., Dec. 11, 2006, at __.  A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the 
conviction.  See United States v. Warner, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 2007), available at 2007 WL 
2363220. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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fairness in trials or merely another domain for lawyers to seek strategic and tactical 
advantages over their adversaries. The Supreme Court has developed numerous doctrines 
to police excesses in jury selection, most famously with the Batson limitations on the use 
of peremptory challenges to strike racial minorities from juries.87  
 What is Batson about? Is it an attempt to make race a non-factor in the selection 
of jurors? Is it about ensuring that juries resemble jury pools, which in turn reflect the 
demographics of the citizenry as a whole? Does it apply to demographic factors besides 
race?88 Is it about ensuring that criminal defendants receive trials that are deemed 
legitimate and fair? Do Batson rights protect prosecutors and civil litigants, as well?89 Or 
does Batson protect prospective jurors’ rights against mistreatment on account of race? 
The answers to these questions are important, because they can help us evaluate the 
growing reliance on external sources of information about prospective jurors. In post-
Batson cases, the Supreme Court has implied that all these interests are furthered by 
Batson.90 At the same time, by grounding its analysis in the Equal Protection Clause, and 
focusing on the harm to prospective jurors, the Court has suggested that a constitutional 
violation may have occurred even if the ultimate jury verdict was not affected by the 
unlawful use of peremptory challenges.91 
 If making race a non-factor in jury selection is Batson’s primary objective, as a 
mechanism for protecting the rights of either litigants or prospective jurors, then it is 
quite clear that Batson and its progeny have not achieved this goal.92 Batson can be 
evaded by the lawyer who strikes some prospective jurors on the basis of race, so long as 
not “too many” prospective jurors are stricken on that basis. Alternatively, the lawyer 
might successfully articulate a non-race-based rationale, such as a prospective juror’s 
                                                 
87 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
88 It does.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). 
89 It does.  See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that Batson prohibits the defendant from 
using race as a basis for peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614  
(1991) (extending Batson to civil cases). 
90 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (“Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, 
causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from 
participation in the judicial process.”). 
91 See Leading Cases, Jury Selection – Batson Challenges, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 218, 224 n.45 (2005). 
92 Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Jury Selection: An Empirical Investigation of Demographic 
Bias, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 285, 298 (1995); Melilli, supra note , at 503. 
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demeanor,93 for striking a disproportionate number of racial group members. This is not 
difficult to do – recent experimental evidence suggests that college students and attorneys 
alike instinctively identify non-race-based rationales for decisions that were driven by a 
prospective juror’s race.94 To make race a non-factor, much stronger medicine than 
Batson would be required. Namely, attorneys should not be able to see prospective jurors 
during voir dire, but would be limited to examining jurors behind an opaque screen (as in 
The Dating Game or an orchestral audition). Moreover, attorneys should be denied access 
to prospective jurors’ names and addresses, which often indicate racial background with 
substantial reliability and enable snooping attorneys to obtain a wealth of information 
about the jurors from third parties. The court might have to disguise prospective jurors’ 
voices and colloquialisms as well. This would be a plausible way of conducting jury 
selection, and it may be optimal as a means of curtailing troubling, exclusionary 
practices, albeit at significant cost.95 
 At the other extreme, the law might address the problem of racially exclusionary 
uses of peremptory strikes by providing more information, not less. On this score, the 
Northern District policy is merely a baby step in the right direction. The government 
could report to the parties juror credit scores, military service records, bankruptcy filings, 
and involvement in prior litigation. It could review mental health records in the state’s 
possession to screen out those who might be unfit for service. It could scour public 
records and conduct Lexis-Nexis searches to provide the parties with any relevant 
information. 
 If the government did all these things, essentially providing dossiers on all 
prospective jurors, one might expect to see less discrimination on the basis of race, 
                                                 
93 Melilli, supra note 74, at 483. 
94 Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: 
Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 Law & Human 
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abolished). 
 30 of 82  
national origin, religion, gender, and other immutable characteristics. Indeed, a regime of 
full and symmetrical disclosure of juror profile information to the litigants conceivably 
could do more to combat the improper use of race as a proxy than Batson ever has.  
 Alas, there is an important complication here, suggesting that such a regime may 
be more appealing in the employment context than in the jury context. The available 
empirical evidence suggests that race is itself a strong predictor of whether a juror will 
initially vote to impose the death penalty in a capital case, with whites twice as likely as 
blacks to vote for the death sentence.96 Socioeconomic status, by contrast, had no effect 
on initial votes by jurors.97 A capable defense lawyer thus might not be using race as a 
proxy for anything other than a juror’s propensity to send his client to death row. Indeed, 
black and white jurors appear to behave differently in a number of respects, such as their 
certainty that a defendant is guilty, their perceptions of the defendant’s remorse, and their 
assessments of the defendant’s future dangerousness.98 These behavioral tendencies 
evidently alter outcomes in capital jury sentences, with counties that have large African 
American populations imposing the death penalty at lower rates than counties with 
smaller African American populations.99 Some less careful survey evidence suggests that 
race is an equally important predictive factor in civil trials, swamping the effects of 
income, gender, and political inclinations.100 In civil cases, African Americans appear to 
be markedly more sympathetic to plaintiffs than Caucasians, at both the liability and 
damages phases.101  
 Maybe in the jury context, race is an unusually valuable proxy for propensity to 
convict or impose liability on a defendant. If African American and Anglo jurors 
approach legal controversies in fundamentally different ways because of their radically 
divergent interactions with police officers, or large employers, banks, insurers, and other 
                                                 
96 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the 
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97 Id. at 285. 
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institutional defendants,102 then providing litigants with more information about all 
prospective jurors may do little to stem prosecutor and defense counsel’s reliance on race 
in voir dire. But if that is the case, it raises the question of whether the Batson doctrine is 
even a sensible one, or whether Batson ought to be replaced instead with affirmative rules 
mandating that each empanelled jury roughly reflect the racial diversity of the jury pool. 
 Another factor should temper our embrace of pervasive reputation information in 
the voir dire context. Jury duty is already viewed as an unappetizing prospect for many 
Americans, and the loss of privacy associated with comprehensive government 
background checks could prompt stiff resistance and exacerbate juror absenteeism. To be 
sure, a savvy juror appreciates the possibility that litigants will gather information about 
her already, but Americans often feel more dread about governmental possession of 
private information than they do upon realizing that such information has been obtained 
by nongovernmental actions.103 Even more important, the loss of privacy associated with 
submitting a job application or trying to find housing will not be sufficient to deter 
reasonable people from the enterprise. Employment and housing are necessities, so we 
can safely assume that the behavioral distortions associated with pervasive reputation 
information will be minimal. Not so for jury duty. Jury duty is compulsory, but the 
government cannot enforce its compulsory nature on the citizenry without incurring 
substantial costs and generating significant resentment. Paradoxically, it may be the case 
that it is necessary for the government to forego gathering a great deal of pertinent 
information about prospective jurors to avoid diminishing the quality of the pool of 
willing jurors.104  
E. Medical Diagnosis and Treatment 
 Employers’ use of statistical discrimination is troubling enough, as it endangers 
peoples’ livelihoods. When doctors and other health professionals use the same strategies 
for coping with incomplete information, it risks patients’ lives. Yet the health disparities 
                                                 
102 Cf. Fahringer, supra note 75, at 119 (“[B]lacks who have seen the ravages of the drug trade in their 
community must be considered carefully in a narcotics prosecution.”). 
103 See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
Yale L.J. 1151 (2004). 
104 This assumes, of course, that it is not only those with “something to hide” who value their privacy 
rights.  See generally Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy, 44 San Diego L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2007). 
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literature suggests that doctors behave in much the same way that employers, trial 
attorneys, and other decisionmakers do, with wrenching consequences for African 
American patients. 
 Why would doctors use statistical discrimination in treating patients? One 
possible explanation not well explored in the medical literature is that statistical 
discrimination may be a strategy for staying out of prison. In recent years, state and 
federal law enforcement officials have become more aggressive about tracking the 
prescription of opioids by pursuing physicians who prescribe medication that is 
subsequently diverted into the black market.105 Surveys of physicians show that many are 
very concerned about prescribing narcotics to patients suffering from pain because of a 
fear that such prescriptions will trigger drug enforcement agency investigations,106 with a 
sizable minority of physicians admitting that they “give patients a limited supply of pain 
medications to avoid being investigated” and a larger minority expressing concern that 
“prescribing narcotics for patients with chronic pain is likely to trigger a drug 
enforcement agency investigation.”107 
 Although one would hope that prosecutorial discretion will prevent prosecutions 
of doctors who prescribed in good faith subsequently diverted narcotics, this fear of law 
enforcement investigations is not misplaced. Surveys of prosecutors suggest that doctors 
face a genuine risk of being charged with serious crimes, even if their decisions to 
prescribe narcotics were medically defensible.108 And many jurisdictions track 
physicians’ prescriptions of narcotics, forwarding copies of all filled prescriptions to law 
enforcement personnel, a practice whose constitutionality the Supreme Court upheld in 
                                                 
105 See Dana A. Forgione et al., Diversion of Prescription Drugs to the Black Market: What the States Are 
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Whalen v. Roe.109 Successful prosecutions of physicians who were duped by their patients 
into dispensing narcotics have garnered substantial media attention of late.110 
 When if a doctor risks incarceration if her patients divert prescribed medication to 
the black market or abuse their medication, then it seems likely that she will try to sort 
between those patients who are risky and those who are less risky. Race is a plausible 
proxy here, and there is evidence suggesting that doctors use it in prescribing narcotics. A 
survey of 397 patients being treated for chronic nonmalignant pain, and their primary 
care physicians, found that although African American patients reported experiencing 
more pain than Caucasian patients,111 Caucasians were significantly more likely to be 
treated with stronger and longer-acting opioids.112 Even after the researchers controlled 
for socioeconomic and other factors, Caucasians were more than twice as likely as 
African Americans to be on opioids.113 Notably, there was no correlation between race 
and the use of non-opioids pain drugs.114 What explained the racial disparity? Not 
differential access to insurance or other payment options.115 And not divergent 
preferences among African American and Caucasian patients.116 The study authors 
concluded that the “more pronounced racial differences for strong and long-acting 
opioids suggest that systematic mistrust, bias, or stereotyping phenomena could be in 
play.”117 
 As with statistical discrimination in employment, there is a large literature to 
suggest that doctors treat patients differently on the basis of race in a variety of settings. 
Although fear of prosecution is a plausible explanation for statistical discrimination in the 
                                                 
109 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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opioid prescription context, African American patients appear to receive worse treatment 
in a variety of settings, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors.118 And this 
worse treatment can be explained by physicians’ attitudes. A well-designed study by van 
Ryn and Burke found that physicians view African Americans as more likely to abuse 
medication and less likely to comply with doctors’ orders.119 These differences do not go 
unnoticed by African American patients.120 Statistical discrimination on the basis of 
socioeconomic status also has been observed in some settings – for example, 
nephrologists are more likely to say they would refer a child of higher socioeconomic 
status than lower socioeconomic status to a transplant doctor, with the likely explanation 
being the belief that wealthier parents are more likely to ensure compliance with a 
rigorous post-operative recovery regime.121   
 It would be tempting to say that these disparities could be eliminated by imposing 
liability on physicians who engage in statistical discrimination, or by embracing efforts to 
re-educate physicians to act in a colorblind manner. But scholars of health disparities 
understand the inadequacies and dangers of such an approach.122 Just as employment 
litigation and employer diversity training are incomplete remedies for discriminatory 
hiring practices,123 they will be incomplete remedies in the prescription context. Balsa, 
McGuire, and Meredith sensibly note that doctors’ “reliance on ‘priors’ related to age, 
gender, or race, when low-cost reliable tests are available, is difficult to justify.”124 In the 
treatment of pain, however, where existing diagnostic constraints often force doctors to 
rely on a patients’ own statements and visible acts to discern the extent of a patient’s 
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suffering, there are no low-cost reliable tests. But there are information-based strategies 
that can reduce the appeal of statistical discrimination. 
 When doctors encounter patients who they believe are abusing prescription 
medication, diverting medication to the black-market, overstating symptoms, or failing to 
comply with protocols for taking medications or recuperating, they routinely include this 
information in the patient’s medical records.125  If the contents of these medical records 
were easily transferred from one physician to other physicians likely to encounter a 
particular patient, then doctors would not need to engage in statistical discrimination on 
the basis of race and other problematic proxies. The statistical discrimination problem, in 
short, helps make a compelling case for the computerization of medical records, a process 
that is proceeding at a snail’s pace in many parts of the country.126 A large literature 
documents the costs of continued reliance on antiquated medical record-keeping.127 
Diagnosis becomes more difficult. Patient choice’s of doctors are effectively constrained. 
Tests and other procedures may be duplicated unnecessarily. This paper suggests that in 
addition to all these problems, our failure to bring medical recordkeeping into the twenty-
first century may be contributing to distasteful discrimination, and that African American 
patients are enduring unnecessary pain and inappropriate treatment as a consequence.   
F. Insurance 
 Earlier in this paper I identified statistical discrimination as a strategy that the law 
prohibits. Yet it turns out that this is not always the case. Take insurance markets. 
Insurers are generally prohibited from charging differential rates for insurance on the 
basis of race.128 But some jurisdictions permit insurers to discriminate on the basis of 
gender, for example, in the automobile and life insurance contexts.129 And many 
jurisdictions permit insurers to use a customer’s zip code as a basis for premium setting, 
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which is particularly controversial in light of the higher premiums that residents of 
predominantly African American neighborhoods often pay.130 
 An important reason why insurers must rely on these forms of statistical 
discrimination is the absence of reliable information about most drivers’ behavior. There 
are a few terrible drivers who routinely get into accidents or incur speeding tickets, but 
outside of these extremes, insurers have little information to go on. Information about 
near misses, day-to-day aggressive driving, and other unsafe behavior is almost 
nonexistent. As a result, the good driver who is involved in a fluke accident in which he 
was not at fault will likely see his insurance premiums rise, a skilled and responsible 
teenaged driver will pay extremely high premiums solely because of her age, and the 
generally safe driver who is caught in a speed trap can expect to incur a substantial 
insurance penalty.131 
 It need not be this way. As I have argued elsewhere,132 the government is capable 
of generating a much more reliable and rich set of information about individual drivers’ 
observed behavior. All the government needs to do is mandate the participation of all 
motorists in a “How’s My Driving?” program of the sort that have become nearly 
ubiquitous for bus and commercial fleets. Doing so would generate an enormous amount 
of additional information that would enable insurers to set premiums without having to 
collectively sanction motorists who have the misfortune of being young, being male, 
being unmarried, or living in predominantly African American neighborhoods.133   
 In the automobile insurance market, social insurance concerns don’t loom 
particularly large. By mandating automobile insurance coverage, legislators are primarily 
seeking to ensure that the victims of vehicular collisions will be compensated for their 
injuries and losses. When jurisdictions mandate health insurance, as Massachusetts has 
done, or provide health insurance, as the Medicare and Medicaid programs have done, 
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they are acting on the basis of a somewhat different set of principles.134 Those principles 
emphasize society’s interest in helping those who develop health complications as a 
result of bad luck, bad genes, or even bad lifestyle choices. In short, insurance markets 
are not monolithic, and government information policy may be a more useful policy tool 
in those settings, like driving, where social insurance considerations do not loom 
particularly large. But this argument about the benefits of making motorist behavior 
information more widely available does not translate into an argument for widespread 
availability of individuals’ genetic information.135   
G. Immigration Law 
 Throughout American history, policymakers have been using national origin 
proxies to try to shape the nation’s workforce and polity. Most obviously, national origin 
is a proxy for race, so Americans who cared about the racial composition of the United 
States could use immigration policy as a tool for achieving their desired ends.136 
Employers might use proxies in much the same way, seeking out immigrants from 
particular nations because that nation’s inhabitants are believed to possess particular 
characteristics.137 
 My colleagues, Adam Cox and Eric Posner, recently analyzed immigration design 
decisions as a response to asymmetric information in the international migration 
context.138 They suggested that the immigrant has private information about his own 
attributes, preferences, and intentions that United States customs and immigration 
officials lack. The government thus faces a decision between two sorts of strategies – it 
can invest in gathering more information about prospective entrants before they are 
admitted to the United States, or it can admit entrants freely, gather information about 
                                                 
134 To be sure, concerns about externalities do arise in the health insurance context.  For example, concerns 
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them when they are here, and then deport those whose actions in the United States 
suggest that they will not be positive net contributors to society.139 Where the information 
gathering and processing costs of assessing individuals’ likely contributions to society 
based on their behavior abroad are high, we can expect to see the government rely more 
on deportation. Where those costs are low, we can expect to see the government rely on 
exclusion.  
 The United States is not alone in having undergone a reputation revolution in the 
past decade or so. Other developed nations have also seen explosive growth in their data 
broker industries,140 though the skeptical approach of European Union lawmakers toward 
these developments have helped apply the brakes to this development somewhat.141 Of 
course, while immigration to the United States from developed nations like Canada, 
Japan, Germany, and Australia is not negligible, it pales in comparison to migration from 
developing nations in which accurate consumer information databases do not exist.142 
While it is no longer difficult to imagine the integration of cross-platform reputation 
scores with wearable computers in this country, the ubiquity of such devices and data in 
Ecuador or the Philippines seems a long way off, at best. 
 Yet it is precisely the absence of reliable information about individuals that causes 
immigration officials to rely on proxies like national origin. In response to the events of 
September 11, 2001, the United States substantially curtailed the number of visas issues 
to residents of predominantly Islamic nations, and made it more difficult for foreigners to 
study in the United States higher education system.143 (One of the terrorists involved in 
the September 11 attacks was in the United States on a student visa).144 There were some 
exceptions to this policy of national origin-based exclusion. In-demand specialists like 
doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics had a somewhat easier time obtaining visas,145 
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– in part because their skill sets were in particular demand, but in part because their 
having obtained degrees in those fields suggested that it was unlikely that they would 
present a threat to American national security.146 Wealthy foreigners with at least $1 
million to invest in new American businesses also have a much easier time gaining 
visas.147 Although this program was justified as an engine of job creation in the United 
States,148 it might, alternatively, be characterized as another immigration proxy – 
foreigners with disposable investment capital and a commitment to investing it in U.S.-
based startups might be particularly likely to be desirable migrants.149 
 Notice what is going on here – proxies are everywhere in immigration decisions. 
National origin . . . Education . . . Career path . . . Age . . . Gender . . . English fluency . . . 
Family ties in the United States . . . Wealth . . . All these attributes wind up determining 
who is admitted to the United States and who is not. We rely on these proxies to indicate 
who might pose a security risk, who might fill a technically or physically demanding job, 
who might wind up on the welfare rolls and who might wind up starting a business, who 
is likely to commit ordinary crimes, who might have a hard time finding employment in 
the United States, who is likely to be assimilated, who is likely to return home when her 
visa expires, and who is likely to overstay his visa. 
 It would, of course, be far simpler if immigration authorities could rely on 
accurate information about individuals, rather than using these group-based proxies. But 
there are serious impediments to such an approach – with individual-based information 
scarce in the developing world, there may be little to augment reliance on crude proxies 
like national origin or English fluency. And even as reputational information becomes 
more readily available in the developing world, there will be serious questions about its 
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reliability. Given the possibilities for a group, acting in concert, to create a falsely 
positive reputation profile for one of their members, it would be an inappropriate leap of 
faith to rely heavily on such information in deciding that someone poses a low threat to 
national security. 
 This dichotomy suggests something counterintuitive, which is that the United 
States ought not to embrace a one-size-fits-all methodology for evaluating visa 
applicants. Rather, it should rely more heavily on individual-based-reputational 
information when assessing immigrants from those countries with well developed 
reputational infrastructures, and more heavily on proxies or post-entry surveillance and 
deportation for visa seekers from nations where the reputational infrastructure is 
nonexistent or of unreliable quality. The Japanese immigrant can be assessed rather 
reliably prior to entry and then by-and-large ignored; the Mongolian immigrant might 
need to be judged via proxies or admitted provisionally and subjected to greater 
monitoring of his employment status and involvement in the criminal justice system by 
immigration officials.    
 The foregoing analysis also sheds light on one of the most frustrating aspects of 
U.S. immigration law. Political asylum appeals comprise a very significant percentage of 
the docket in the federal appellate courts.150 In these cases, an applicant typically asserts 
persecution on the basis of religion, political beliefs, or some other factor. Almost 
invariably, the applicant comes from a nation where a distinct societal group is being 
persecuted – immigrants from France and New Zealand have the good sense not to seek 
asylum in the United States very often. Yet these asylum seekers also tend to come from 
nations with poor private reputational infrastructures. To the extent that any entity in 
these countries has a solid grasp of the attributes of individual citizens, it is the autocratic 
government, and these government databases are not accessible to American immigration 
officials. Genuine asylum seekers often flee without identification documents and other 
forms of corroboration, or they may have their documents stolen in transit.151 As a result, 
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the asylum seeker typically has his own testimony, and little else in the way of proof to 
support his application.152 U.S. law makes this testimony, standing alone, sufficient to 
establish asylum eligibility.153 
 Yet there are many immigration judges who will be disinclined to grant asylum 
applications for ideological reasons, and more immigration judges still who will be 
skeptical that an asylum seeker is really just an economic immigrant or would be an 
undesirable resident.154  With an absence of verified information about the asylum 
seeker’s background and actions in his home country, the immigration judges often deny 
asylum applications based on adverse credibility determinations. Because an immigration 
judge is in the best position to assess an applicant’s credibility, appellate courts are 
reluctant to reverse adverse credibility findings.155 The law does require, however, that 
the immigration judge identify clear and cogent justifications for deeming an applicant’s 
testimony incredible.156 
 As a result, asylum cases in the federal appellate courts often involve a particular 
pattern. First, an immigration judge rejects an application on the basis of an adverse 
credibility judgment. Second, inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony form the basis 
for that rejection. Third, appellate courts examine whether the purported inconsistencies 
are legitimate, and warrant the adverse credibility judgment.157 To illustrate how this 
pattern plays out, I will examine appellate cases from the Ninth and Second Circuits. 
 In Chebchoub v. INS,158 the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of a Moroccan 
who had been denied asylum in the United States. Chebchoub alleged that his brother, 
Mustafa, was a leader of Movement Forward, a socialist opposition group.159 The 
Moroccan government allegedly harassed, tortured, and imprisoned Chebchoub as a way 
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of luring Mustafa out of hiding.160 He alleged that this behavior continued even after 
Mustafa was expelled from Morocco and granted asylum in France, as the government 
began to believe that Chebchoub himself was part of Movement Forward.161 Yet 
inconsistencies in Chebchoub’s testimony tripped him up in proceedings before the 
immigration judge. The judge cited “no less than 22 inconsistencies,” including 
inconsistent testimony about “the events leading up to and surrounding his departure,” 
and “discrepancies between his testimony and his affidavit regarding the number of times 
he was arrested in the period prior to his departure.”162 The appellate court found these 
inconsistencies to be a satisfactory basis for finding his testimony not credible.163  
 Notably, the appellate court then noted an additional basis for affirming the 
immigration judge’s adverse credibility judgment – Chebchoub had produced no affidavit 
from either Mustafa, who supposedly had been granted asylum in France, or anyone in 
the United States who was involved in Movement Forward and could corroborate 
Chebchoub’s involvement in that group.164 The court noted that it was too much to expect 
Chebchoub to produce corroborating documentation from Morocco, whose government 
would have no reason to cooperate with Chebchoub’s request, but getting “an affidavit 
from a close relative living in Western Europe should have been a relatively 
uncomplicated task that would not pose the type of particularized evidentiary burden that 
would excuse corroboration.”165 In Chebchoub we see an appellate court sensibly 
recognizing how the very different information environments of France and Morocco 
ought to be reflected in varying burdens placed on asylum applicants seeking to extract 
corroborating evidence from those locations.   
 The Second Circuit’s opinion in Guan v. INS provides some indication of the 
difficulties that arise when an asylum seeker’s corroborating information is largely 
located in a country with a relatively poor private information infrastructure. Guan, like 
Chebchoub, involved an adverse credibility finding and a lack of corroborating evidence. 
The petitioner in that case, Guan, a father of two, fled China because he feared forced 
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sterilization for him or his wife under that country’s “One Child Policy.”166 The 
immigration judge faulted Guan for presenting two marriage certificates with the same 
photograph of himself and his wife – a curiosity because one marriage certificate was 
issued in 1989 and the other was issued nine years later.167 The judge further noted a 
discrepancy in the date of birth for Guan’s wife between her birth certificate and the x-
ray of her tubal ligation.168 The judge also faulted the petitioner “for not producing 
contemporaneous evidence of the births” of his children, and doubted the authenticity of 
a doctor’s report concerning his wife’s tubal ligation.169 The judge then pointed to several 
inconsistencies in Guan’s testimony concerning how he met the doctor who examined his 
wife, and how long he had been in hiding before flying to the U.S.170 Finally, the judge 
found Guan’s testimony incredible on the basis of his demeanor, as the judge noted that 
Guan was hesitant, defensive under questioning about inconsistencies, and requested 
“two or three water breaks during his testimony, which . . . appeared to have been used as 
an opportunity to formulate a response when confronted with a conflicting 
inconsistency.”171 
 The Second Circuit granted Guan’s petition for review, essentially reversing the 
immigration judge’s decision. In dealing with the evidentiary issues, the court 
admonished the immigration judge for assuming that Western assumptions about birth 
certificate and marriage certificate documentation would prevail in China, with the court 
insisting “that IJs’ standards for written corroboration must be calibrated to the norms 
and practices of the aliens’ home countries, and the circumstances of the aliens’ 
departure.”172 But what of the demeanor evidence upon which the judge based his 
adverse credibility finding? Here, the court noted that Guan had only requested water 
once during his testimony, not two or three times as the immigration judge stated.173 The 
appellate court thought that this math error was sufficient to reverse the adverse 
credibility determination, and did not comment on the immigration judge’s findings of 
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the petitioner’s defensiveness and hesitancy under cross-examination.174 The court 
explained the remand by noting its lack of confidence that the immigration judge would 
have reached the adverse credibility finding in the absence of this error.175 
 The Guan case illustrates the bizarre nature of asylum litigation in information-
poor environments. Immigration judges spend their time trying to find inconsistencies in 
the petitioner’s testimony and documentary evidence so that they can order the petitioners 
deported, and then appellate courts spend their time looking for inconsistencies between 
the immigration judges’ opinions and the trial transcripts, so that they can reverse those 
deportation orders. Add into the mix significant cultural misunderstandings, inaccurately 
translated testimony, poorly compensated and often inept immigration attorneys 
representing the petitioners, and it is little wonder that the immigration adjudication 
system is so widely regarded as broken.176 There is a fundamental problem at the core of 
this – the lack of accurate information about individuals – and in the coming decades as 
information infrastructures improve in the developing world, we can hope that asylum 
proceedings will be newly refocused on the relevant legal issues.    
H. Consumer Protection Law 
 Imagine an ordinary dispute between a consumer and a service provider. Say a 
Citibank customer orders foreign currency to be delivered to his bank branch, and 
Citibank promises to deliver the currency before the customer’s departure date, but the 
currency does not arrive on time due to a bank error. As a result, the customer must incur 
$100 in higher currency exchange fees abroad. The customer could demand a refund of 
the extra fees from his bank, but if the bank refuses to pay up, the customer’s remedies 
will not be particularly attractive. 
 The customer could sue the bank for breach of contract, perhaps in small claims 
court or via an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that the customer may have 
consented to at the time he opened the account. But the opportunity cost of filing suit or 
pursuing arbitration will easily exceed any potential recovery. The customer could search 
for similarly situated individuals in the hopes of assembling a class action, but even a 
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successful lawsuit is likely to leave the plaintiffs’ lawyers as the primary beneficiaries. Or 
perhaps the customer could complain to the Federal Reserve, which regulates Citibank. 
An isolated complaint is likely to lead nowhere, but a flurry of similar complaints to the 
Fed could prompt it to take action. None of these avenues seem particularly promising 
methods of dealing with a garden-variety dispute.  
 Enter Epinions, the Better Business Bureau, and similar clearinghouses for 
information about the behavior of companies. The disgruntled customer can post a review 
of Citibank’s services on Epinions.com, a web site that presently includes 135 other 
reviews of Citibank’s service – some favorable, and some unfavorable. Adding a 136th 
review would contribute to a public good. There are several banking options for most 
Americans, and consumers who are trying to decide which bank to choose will now have 
the benefit of a richer, publicly available range of views. Such a posting might have 
salutary effects on Citibank’s future behavior as well. At least in theory, Citibank should 
try to improve its service so as to avoid further negative reviews that will scare away 
potential customers.177 Epinions thus functions as a dispute discourager and potentially a 
dispute resolution device.178 In a case like the one I just described it is likely the best way 
of addressing a dispute. 
 We now encounter a puzzle. The state subsidizes the courts to a very significant 
degree. If I choose to pursue this case in small claims court, state court, or any other 
tribunal, the state will pay the salary of the judges, law clerks, and administrative 
personnel who will help resolve the matter. If, on the other hand, I choose what is in this 
case the more efficient route, and the more sensible route of lodging a complaint on 
Epinions, the state subsidy will disappear. On the margins, then, the state is shifting 
individuals from what will sometimes be the more efficient dispute resolution forum 
toward the least efficient dispute resolution forum.179 
                                                 
177 For a description of how Tripadvisor.com has played this role in the hotel industry, see Michelle 
Higgins, The Web Gives Hotel Guests the Last Word, N.Y. Times, April 8, 2007, at 56. 
178 For an analysis of similar online dispute resolution mechanisms, see Pablo Cortes, The Potential of 
Online Dispute Resolution as a Consumer Redress Mechanism (Working Draft July 6, 2007), available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=998865>.  
179 This is a point made eloquently in a recent law review article, which argued that the government subsidy 
for courts weakens the private market for alternative dispute resolution.  See Arthur B. Pearlstein, The 
Justice Bazaar: Dispute Resolution through Emergent Private Ordering as a Superior Alternative to 
Authoritarian Court Bureaucracy, 22 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 739, 783-88 (2007).  In a somewhat 
 46 of 82  
 There is an argument, of course, that the state achieves particular public goods 
whenever litigation occurs. Namely, litigation creates precedents, and precedents guide 
third parties in their efforts to understand what the law requires of them.180 But litigation 
is not the only mechanism for achieving positive externalities arising out of dispute 
resolution. Recall our Citibank complaint. In articulating a grievance about Citibank a 
customer has both encouraged that corporation to respond to the substance of his 
complaints, and made the interested public aware of one data point that reflects on the 
company’s customer service. This is not the same sort of public externality as the value 
of precedent – because it lacks a resolution of the case by a neutral third party it is more 
akin to the public benefits that would arise if all legal briefs were made public. Would it 
be more useful for the public to have, readily available, copies of all the complaints filed 
against a company, and the company’s responses to those complaints, or would it be 
more useful for the public to have one judicial opinion resolving one of those disputes? 
The answer is not clear. 
 Another potential positive externality resulting from litigation is the potential for 
the judgment to defuse a controversy that might otherwise escalate. When the courts 
resolve an issue, it reduces the probability that the parties will resort to violent self help 
to settle a dispute, and that violence could harm both the parties to the dispute and 
innocent third parties who get caught in the crossfire. Here again, though, it is by no 
means clear that court adjudication or administrative action is superior to negative 
feedback as a mechanism for defusing heated disputes. There is a large psychological 
literature suggesting that aggrieved individuals feel much better after posting a complaint 
about another’s misconduct, even if the source of the complaint takes no subsequent 
remedial action.181 Written venting, simply put, has great psychological value. It provides 
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a release for the frustrated consumer.182 It enables a consumer to warn other customers 
about a merchant’s misbehavior.183 And it raises the likelihood that the merchant will 
take measures to try to improve the consumer’s experience.184 The process of recalling, 
describing, and making sense of a negative experience seems to make it easier for 
consumers to forget those negative experiences and the accompanying angst.185 
 Services like Epinions, the Better Business Bureau, Angie’s List, and similar 
forums are far less expensive to use than administrative bureaucracies or courts. If the 
target of a complaint is a well-run business, it might well learn how to improve its service 
based on complaints lodged186 and, particularly if it wants to remain in good standing 
with the Better Business Bureau, remedy any wrongs it perpetrated. Customers who have 
their problems addressed successfully are not quite as happy as customers who never 
have any problems to begin with, but they are significantly happier than customers whose 
complaints went unheard.187  
 The more information becomes available about individuals, the more valuable 
resources like Epinions become to their users. Epinions attempts to capture this 
functionality by flagging the reviews of particularly prolific or helpful reviewers. Netflix 
recently rolled out an even better functionality. Netflix uses an algorithm to categorize its 
users based on their film ratings, and generate similarity scores. If I want to decide 
whether I should rent, say Genghis Blues, a documentary that was recently at the top of 
my Netflix queue, I can click on that movie, and see the written reviews of other Netflix 
users, compared with a score revealing the similarity of their movie rankings to my own. 
Netflix user Jamie W didn’t like the movie, giving it only two stars, and Netflix says 
Jamie’s tastes are 63% similar to my own. User BW 57226 loved it, giving it five stars, 
but Netflix says that BW’s tastes are only 41% similar to my own, so maybe I should be 
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skeptical. If I want to explore this further, I can read the contents of Jamie W’s review 
and BW 57226’s review, to see whose reasons for not liking or liking the film seem more 
pertinent, and Netflix lets me see all their other movie reviews too, so that I can see their 
substantive comments about movies I have seen, and decide whether I am likely to share 
their concerns. 
 These sorts of innovations have applications well beyond movie ratings. Imagine 
if every plumber, every manufactured product, every cell phone provider, every home 
builder, every tour guide, every hair stylist, every accountant, every attorney, every golf 
pro, every professor, and every taxi driver was rated in the same way, with both the 
detailed written reviews and summary statistics that Netflix currently provides. In such a 
world, there would be a diminished need for an FTC or deputy state attorneys general, 
because consumers would police misconduct themselves. In such a world, fewer disputes 
would wind up in court because unscrupulous or inept merchants or service providers 
would have a much harder time finding customers.188 Though the technology for these 
resources already exists, and in some cases (e.g., Avvo.com for rating lawyers or 
ratemyprofessor.com for academics or angieslist.com for plumbers), those services have 
been launched. That said, these web services lack the large data sets that help keep 
Netflix ratings accurate. Though Netflix customers are quite willing to write reviews of 
movies, plumber customers are a bit more reluctant. And while ratemyprofessors.com 
sports a handful of student reviews of professors, universities and colleges do not import 
the much richer data collected from official end-of-the-semester evaluations into those 
databases. Because there is a dearth of reviews at these web sites, there is an insufficient 
incentive for consumers to consult them before hiring a service provider or enrolling in a 
class. 
 These problems suggest the appeal of subsidizing consumer-oriented ratings web 
sites and other low-cost mechanisms for dispute resolution and avoidance. Such subsidies 
could benefit such services on both the supply and demand sides – providing discounts 
for customers who provide detailed evaluations of merchants and service providers, and 
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facilitating access to these databases by individuals whose access to the Internet is limited 
because of economic, educational, or linguistic impediments. 
 There is much that government can do in-kind, to help these resources along as 
well. In many instances, the government will have information about a merchant or 
service provider’s performance that members of the public might lack. For example, only 
the government, and the inspected restaurateur, know the contents of public health 
inspections in many jurisdictions.189 But there is no reason why this information should 
not be posted to restaurant-rating web sites as soon as it becomes available. Similarly, the 
government may have information about criminal proceedings brought against 
accountants, state bar disciplinary proceedings brought against attorneys, or APA-
generated public commentary generated by license renewal requests for radio frequency 
broadcasters. Again, it would be a relatively simple task to aggregate the information that 
is already in the government’s hands and use it to supplement existing privately run 
rating resources. Yet in many circumstances, the information is actually suppressed by 
the government.190    
II. When to Use Information Policy?  
 The preceding discussion suggests that the widespread availability of information 
about individuals and firms ought to alter the way we think about law and public policy 
in a variety of domains. In some settings, such as the employment context, disclosing 
previously private information about individuals may prove to be a desirable government 
intervention. In other settings, such as the juror selection process, there is a stronger 
argument for maintaining the privacy of information about individuals. This part provides 
a new typology of government information policies and draws some general lessons from 
the tour through many legal subject matters. 
A. Of Carrots, Sticks, Curtains, and Search Lights 
 We lawyers are conditioned to think about using law to create private incentives 
through two well-known tools: Carrots and sticks. The carrot approach rewards desirable 
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private behavior (perhaps through tax incentives, subsidies, or positive recognition), and 
the stick approach punishes undesirable behavior (via criminal fines, civil liability, or the 
use of the bully pulpit). Upon reflection, however, carrots and sticks are not all there is. 
We are also familiar with curtains. Government can try to make potentially observable 
characteristics obscure, so as to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to act 
on the basis of observable characteristics. This is what legislators do when they attempt 
to restrict genetic discrimination, it is what progressive reformers attempted to do when 
they created non-partisan elections, thereby preventing voters from electing judges or 
mayors on the basis of party affiliations, and various doctrines limiting the sorts of 
information that attorneys can collect about prospective jurors follow the same tack. 
 These “curtain” strategies have been advocated in the antidiscrimination context 
as well. Indeed, some efforts to reform antidiscrimination law have suggested that 
statistical discrimination can be mitigated if the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of 
information about a candidates’ race, religion, or gender. 191 With less information, 
decisionmakers presumably will focus more on a job applicant’s qualifications, and less 
on the applicant’s skin pigment.  
 Search lights are less familiar than curtains, but this paper has suggested that they 
provide a fourth policy alternative. The state can make private discrimination on the basis 
of illegitimate or misleading observable characteristics less appealing by making 
legitimate or informative characteristics more easily observable. This is what the 
government does when it mandates the placement of visible signs rating the hygiene of 
each Los Angeles restaurant outside that establishment’s front door based on public 
health inspections, a policy that has significantly reduced hospitalizations from food-
related illnesses, increased revenues for restaurants sporting high hygiene grades, and 
reduced revenues for restaurants that must advertise their barely passing grades.192 This is 
what the government does when it publishes information about the identities of those 
with criminal histories. And this is the basic strategy behind mandatory S.E.C. 
disclosures in corporate law.   
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 Note that the framework described here eschews any act-omission distinction. 
Just as we can equate the absence of a carrot with a stick, at least in the presence of many 
other carrots, we can understand the absence of a government search light as equivalent 
to a curtain. In some settings, the law will reduce the observability of individual attributes 
through affirmative acts (like privacy tort protections), and in other settings, it will reduce 
the observability of individual attributes via omissions (like antiquated and obsolete 
public information dissemination strategies).193 An information asymmetry might result 
just as easily from an affirmative government act as a failure to act. To the extent that 
there are relevant differences between these acts and omissions, they would stem from 
their differing social meaning.  
 This paper’s most generalizable insight concerns the importance of search lights 
and their potential to address a large number of social ills. This search light strategy will 
not always be the optimal one, just as carrots, sticks, and curtains may fail us at times. 
But we can do more with four tools than we can with three, and this part will identify 
those settings in which search light strategies are well-suited or poorly suited. 
B. Animus Based Discriminators and Pretext 
 Where statistical discrimination is more prevalent than animus-based 
discrimination, policymakers should rely on search light strategies. Where animus-based 
discrimination is more prevalent, curtain strategies will be appropriate. The reason why is 
rather straightforward: It is easy for animus-based discriminators to identify a pretextual 
reason for rejecting an applicant when they have lots of information about the applicant, 
and harder for the discriminator to point to a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for an 
adverse decision when the decisionmaker lacks information about the candidate. For 
example, suppose that an employer dislikes African Americans and refuses to hire a well-
qualified African American applicant on the basis of the applicant’s race. If the employer 
has access to information about the applicant’s credit history, social relations, academic 
record, prior employment evaluations, and the like, then it will be relatively easy for the 
employer to falsely claim that information contained in those resources explained the 
decision not to hire the applicant. No applicant is perfect, after all. By contrast, if all the 
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employer knows about the applicant is his skin color, then it will be impossible for the 
employer to identify a neutral justification for the refusal to hire. In short, given imperfect 
information about decisionmakers’ true motives, the search light strategy will backfire 
when it is used to provide an animus-based discriminator with additional information. 
 In the jury selection context, query whether the motivations of the parties seeking 
to strike a juror of a particular race from a panel matter. If Batson is designed to address 
an injury to prospective jurors, it would seem as though the prosecutor who strikes 
African Americans from the panel because he hates African Americans is more 
dangerous than the prosecutor who strikes African Americans from the panel because he 
believes that doing so is more likely to result in the conviction of the African American 
defendant.194 But while there are indications in the case law that Batson is designed to 
protect jurors,195 the doctrine is invoked by litigants, and these litigants have no incentive 
to make the inflammatory argument that the other side is motivated by something other 
than a desire to maximize their odds of winning at trial. In any event, the analysis here 
suggests an inadequacy of Batson’s effective treatment of all litigants as statistical 
discriminators. The search light strategy will only reduce reliance on the prospective 
jurors’ race if the litigant whose actions are challenged is engaged in rational, statistical 
discrimination.     
C. False Information 
 Accurate information is a necessary ingredient of any effort to combat statistical 
discrimination via government information policy. Some of the information discussed 
herein – military records, records of criminal convictions, bankruptcy records, 
immigration and naturalization documents, and the like – will not pose serious accuracy 
problems. To the extent that errors occur, they will often resolve around cases of 
mistaken identity, where someone sharing the same name as another person with an 
undesirable characteristic is thereby penalized.196 These problems can be ameliorated 
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through the use of supplemental identifiers, such as birthdates, birth places, and partial 
Social Security Numbers.  
 A more daunting challenge arises in the context of identity theft. If a bad actor 
successfully hijacks the identity of a good actor, and then uses the good actor’s identity to 
defraud unsuspecting consumers, significant damage can result. The consumers will be 
misled. The good actor’s reputation will be trashed unfairly. And confidence in the 
reputation system as a whole will be eroded. But here is the rub: reliance on search light 
strategies might facilitate identity theft, because private information is often used for 
identity authentication purposes. 
 The logical response is to discourage reliance on personal history information for 
authentication purposes. A regime that widely publicizes consumers’ birthdates is a 
regime in which any bank or credit card company would be foolhardy using birthdates as 
a basis for authentication. The costs of transitioning away from biographical information 
toward password-based authentication and biometrics will not be significant. But nor will 
they be zero. Because identity theft represents such a significant threat to reputation-
reliant dispute avoidance and resolution strategies, these are minor tweaks to business 
practices that need to be made. The more daunting false information problems arise in the 
context of data that is not contained in existing public records, but rather is the product of 
government efforts to facilitate wider availability of information about individuals.  
 Nobody believes that the inaccurate feedback problem can be solved entirely in 
reputation-tracking environments. For example, if the government does try to improve 
the efficiency of the labor market by subsidizing the collection of 360 degree feedback 
and making that feedback transportable across firms, then it will have to deal with 
deliberately or unintentionally false feedback that employee A provides about employee 
B. Critically, if an employer relies heavily on co-worker evaluations in deciding not to 
hire a seemingly qualified applicant, but those evaluations are themselves the product of 
co-worker animus or implicit bias, then the government strategy might be 
counterproductive.197 But, as I have explained at length elsewhere, there are strong 
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reasons to believe that the problems can be ameliorated significantly through the use of 
algorithms designed to locate outlier data points, along with spot-checks and audits 
relying on objective verification.198 Given enough information, these algorithms can 
identify instances where an individual provides suspiciously high levels of negative 
feedback toward members of an identifiable racial or gender group. Once identified, the 
system can then adjust the weight assigned to such feedback, substantially offsetting the 
harm done by feedback that is likely tainted by animus or implicit bias.  
 It is sometimes tempting to use the imperfections in feedback systems as a basis 
for rejecting their use. But the appropriate contrast is not between a world of perfectly 
accurate information about individuals and the sometimes flawed information that can be 
generated by an eBay-style reputation tracking mechanism. There are daunting false 
feedback equivalents in the real world. A poor man buys one expensive suit to appear 
prosperous. A debt-saddled person drives a very nice car or eats at really nice restaurants 
to appear well off. A middle aged person has plastic surgery to appear young. A person of 
average intelligence wears geek chic glasses to appear smarter. An individual fakes an 
accent to appear worldly. A would-be adulterer removes a wedding ring to appear 
unmarried. Reputation tracking systems like eBay’s, Slashdot’s, Tripadvisor’s, and 
Digg’s introduce some false feedback, but because most feedback providers are sincere, 
and algorithms can help the purveyors or users of these sites weigh more heavily the 
feedback provided by reviewers who have proven their reliability, their signal to noise 
ratios are often quite high.  
 There will be contexts in which disseminating feedback information from 
consumers may not be appropriate. Some aspects of the doctor-patient relationship seem 
to fall into this category. Patients are quite capable of assessing physicians’ bedside 
manner, their ability to communicate, their promptness and the like. But in many cases, 
patients will do a poor job assessing physicians’ diagnostic skills, their surgical 
techniques, or the accuracy of their prognoses – at least in the short run. There will be 
selection effects that make the assessments more difficult to evaluate too, though 
feedback can be normalized statistically based on the vagaries of a physician’s patient 
population. More troublingly, if patients are rating physicians and physicians are rating 
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patients publicly, then there will be a strong incentive for physicians and patients to trade 
unduly favorable feedback with each other. This “Pollyanna effect” dynamic has played 
out on eBay, with the result being that eBay feedback is more favorable than it ought to 
be.199 Given the strong interests, identified above, in having physicians provide accurate, 
albeit perhaps unflattering assessments of their patients in their medical records, the 
appropriate regime might (a) make physician assessments of patients available only to 
other physicians in the absence of a court order, or (b) prohibit patients from assessing 
certain physician characteristics, or (c) impose a time lag, whereby patients could only 
assess physician characteristics after some period of time.  
D. Too Much Reputation 
 A strong reputation merely correlates with desirable attributes. It is not a perfect 
proxy for those attributes. As a result, there is a lingering danger that increased reliance 
on individuals’ reputations for sorting purposes will prompt individuals or firms to over-
invest in actions that will improve their reputations.200 For example, a professor might 
pander to his students by providing them with free baked goods on the last day of class, 
not coincidentally the same day that the students will fill out teaching evaluations. Or, 
worse yet, the professor may try to entertain the students at the expense of teaching them. 
Alternatively, a hotel might provide monetary incentives for its customers to provide 
favorable reviews, rather than making capital expenditures that will improve the hotel’s 
amenities or devoting more money to salary, so that more skilled workers will seek 
employment there.201 
 Though they may boost feedback ratings,202 these sorts of activities represent 
wasteful investments, and they also have the potential to degrade the quality of a 
reputation-rating resource. For the latter reason, ratings web sites have devoted 
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substantial resources to trying to sanction firms that employ these tactics.203 The teaching 
evaluation context is easier to monitor. While some students will reward a teacher who 
gives away cookies on the last day of class with stronger evaluations, other students are 
likely to resent the pandering, and note their disapproval of the tactic on their anonymous 
student evaluation forms. If a professor’s colleagues discover this whistle-blowing, then 
the significance of the professor’s generally positive evaluations will be discounted, and 
the baked-goods-dispensing professor will be subjected to negative peer pressure by 
colleagues who would prefer to avoid making wasteful expenditures and have an interest 
in preventing student evaluations from becoming a noisy indicator of teaching quality. In 
short, as long as there are sufficiently large numbers of raters, some heterogeneity in 
attitudes regarding the appropriateness of expenditures designed to enhance reputation 
but not service quality, an a reluctance on the part of feedback providers to lodge false 
accusations of pandering, there is an effective corrective whistle-blowing mechanism that 
will deter excessive investments in reputation.  
 More generally, it is useful to examine the ex ante effects of ubiquitous personal 
information. There are obvious upsides and downsides to such a regime. If we are dealing 
with everyday interactions among people, then it seems likely that the ex ante effects will 
be quite positive.204 That might be one take-away point from Bob Ellickson’s extended 
case study of Shasta County, California – where a well functioning gossip network 
facilitated the formation and enforcement of a seemingly wealth maximizing set of social 
norms.205 It is also a fair take-away from my own analysis of motorist behavior, where 
the practical anonymity of drivers vis-à-vis one another seemed to encourage antisocial 
driving.206 But in other contexts, the ex ante effects of reputation monitoring will be 
undesirable. For example, a ubiquitous feedback mechanism might discourage 
individuals from expressing unpopular opinions about political issues, lest they be given 
negative feedback by scores of median voters.207 Alternatively, having their every move 
watched and profiled might discourage socially beneficial forms of identity 
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experimentation.208 Broadly speaking, then, the use of ubiquitous personal information 
and feedback will be most desirable when majoritarian norms are particularly 
unproblematic. 
 This discussion brings a related point to the forefront, which is that as 
mechanisms for tracking personal information improve, investments in some sorts of 
signaling can be expected to decline. Signaling occurs when an individual makes a costly 
expenditure or takes a costly action so as to increase the likelihood that others will trust 
her or want to pursue economic or social relationships with her.209 Classic examples of 
signaling behavior include conspicuous consumption of luxury items or branded goods, 
foregoing a pre-nuptial agreement as a means of signaling love prior to a marriage, non-
anonymous contributions to cultural charities, or choosing to attending a university 
because of its selective admissions process.210 Although no one has tried to estimate the 
costs associated with signaling, signaling is plausibly one of the largest sources of waste 
in modern economies. People rely on signals when they lack more precise and reliable 
indicators of an individual’s attributes. By making such information more readily 
available, the law could substantially decrease the incentives for individuals to devote 
significant resources to signaling.211  
E. Kings in Disguise 
 King Abdullah of Jordan is famous for donning various disguises and mingling 
with his subjects to get a better sense of what life is like for ordinary Jordanians.212 The 
incognito king has waited in lines at government tax offices, observed traffic regulation 
from behind the wheel of a taxi, and posed as a television journalist to get a sense of life 
in Jordan’s free trade zone. Media accounts of the King’s disguised exploits are usually 
laudatory, suggesting that the experiences enable the monarch to avoid getting an unduly 
rosy account of life in his country. 
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 While the King of Jordan is not walking around the average American city, it is 
possible that disguised reputations help keep our government officials in line as well. 
Take instances of policy brutality in major American cities. When scandals about rough 
treatment emerge, it is often because the police roughed up a prominent minister or 
elected official who is a member of a minority group.213 By seeing the way in which a 
prominent, powerful, and law-abiding African American is treated, the public may learn 
about how their less prominent and powerful but nevertheless law-abiding peers are 
routinely treated. Similarly, to some readers, the story of Oprah and her entourage in 
Paris was newsworthy because it suggested the persistence of racism in French society.214 
On this account, Akerlof’s famous “lemons problem” becomes a “lemons solution” of 
sorts.215 It is therefore worth asking whether a world with ubiquitous reputation 
information is one in which disturbing instances of unequal treatment get swept under the 
rug. 
 Should we tolerate some extra brutality in the hopes that outrage over this 
brutality will raise public consternation and ultimately reduce the incidence of police 
brutality? That seems like a perilous strategy.216 I do not doubt that the possibility that an 
African American motorist might be a well-known minister or city councilman constrains 
the behavior of police officers somewhat. But there are significant advantages that offset 
this loss. A police officer pulling over an African American motorist in an economically 
depressed community might feel few constraints on his behavior until he learned that the 
motorist is the nephew of a well-known minister, a receptionist who answers phones in a 
prominent city councilman’s office, or the uncle of another officer on the same police 
force. Few citizens are celebrities but a lot of people are connected to people with clout. 
If officers approach motorists or pedestrians in a depressed area thinking that anyone who 
isn’t a celebrity is part of an undifferentiated mass, then the King Abdullah effect may do 
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little to keep them honest. There is a tradeoff here, but it is probably one society ought to 
be willing to make. If, as seems plausible, police officers usually underestimate the 
likelihood that a profiled individual is connected to someone with clout, then less 
anonymity for citizens probably will be a net positive.  
F. Who Is the Appropriate Information Provider?   
 In many instances, the government has the best access to information that 
decisionmakers will want to use. Criminal records, bankruptcy records, military service 
records, immigration and naturalization records, academic records from public schools or 
state-run universities, or records regarding membership in licensed professions are 
obvious examples.217 In other instances, valuable information will be generated by 
private parties, and the government might face political or agency constraints that prevent 
it from generating equally accurate information. For example, there is little reason to urge 
the government’s involvement in the generation of consumer credit scores. Although 
Experian and the other credit scoring agencies sometimes make mistakes, their incentives 
are properly aligned, and they are insulated from interest group pressure regarding the 
formula used for credit scores. Similarly, the government should not get into the business 
of running social networking sites or developing auction web sites as a mechanism for 
combating statistical discrimination. There are market actors with substantial comparative 
advantages over the government, and they are already doing a fine job of making new 
information available to the public.218 In these settings, the government’s role should be 
confined to facilitating the adoption of uniform standards (e.g., through subsidies), so that 
information can be aggregated easily from among a number of different social 
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networking web sites and reputations can be transportable from one auction site to 
another. 
 In perhaps the majority of instances, the most appropriate role that the state can 
play in facilitating the development of a robust reputational market is to get out of the 
way. Take an illustrative example. In July of this year, Avvo.com, a new web site that 
rates lawyers, was launched. The web site aspired to do for attorneys what Zagat did for 
restaurants – provide consumers with information that they could use to find a suitable 
lawyer, and collect evaluations of lawyers from fellow attorneys and clients.219 Alas, 
within ten days of its launch, Avvo was sued in a class action lawsuit by attorneys 
alleging that Avvo had violated Washington State’s Consumer Protection Act by 
disseminating unfair and deceptive information about lawyers who were rated by the 
site.220 More precisely, the complaint faulted Avvo’s web site for being subjective, 
unreliable, providing questionably low numerical ratings to Supreme Court justices, law 
school deans, and other highly regarded lawyers, using a non-transparent methodology 
for developing lawyer ratings, and providing incomplete information.221 The suit’s lead 
plaintiff, Browne, was an attorney who claimed to have lost two clients as a result of a 
low Avvo rating, a rating that was tied to a state bar disciplinary proceeding against him, 
which had resulted in an admonition.222  
 Avvo moved for dismissal in short order, arguing that its services were protected 
by the First Amendment, that they were immune from liability under section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the 
state’s Consumer Protection Act.223 If Avvo is liable for its conduct, then it seems likely 
that Zagat may be liable to Pizza Hut if unfavorable restaurant reviews result in a poor 
rating; U.S. News & World Report may be liable to Florida Coastal School of Law for 
placing that law school in the fourth tier, and eBay may be liable to vendors who cannot 
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make sales because they have poor feedback ratings. The federal courts hopefully will 
recognize the untenable nature of all these results.  
 In many contexts, the appropriate legal regime may well be the one dictated by 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (C.D.A.). Under that provision 
providers of interactive computer services cannot be held liable for publishing 
“information provided by another information content provider.”224 But the numerical 
ratings produced by Avvo would not seem to fall under this provision of the Act. Avvo 
could likely avoid liability by invoking the First Amendment’s protections for publishing 
opinions, and they have quite sensibly invoked this doctrine in their pleadings.225 Still, 
one cannot help wondering about the appropriateness of forcing Avvo to resolve their 
dispute with Browne in a legal forum at all. If Browne does not like his rating, and is 
thereby harmed, is a class action lawsuit really the appropriate way of addressing that 
grievance? 
 Under these circumstances, there are superior alternatives. Namely, individuals 
like Browne who believe that false information has been disseminated about them ought 
to have a right of reply – an ability to explain why they believe they have received 
inappropriate ratings from a web site or a complaining consumer.226 This right of reply is 
something that is already built into eBay’s and Tripadvisor’s feedback systems, and users 
of eBay or Tripadvisor vendors typically employ it where they believe they have unfairly 
received negative feedback. An attorney like Browne could make use of his right of reply 
to note that other lawyer-rating services, like Martindale Hubbell, rate him highly. He 
could assert that Avvo’s methodology for calculating lawyer ratings is flawed, using the 
example of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s middling rating as a case in point. He could, in short, 
make many of the arguments that his lawyers made in his complaint to alert consumers to 
the deficiencies of the Avvo rating and entice potential clients back into the fold. Just as 
Congress has enacted § 230 of the C.D.A. to avoid chilling Internet-discussion, it or the 
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225 Browne v. Avvo, Inc., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(c), at 7-14 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2007). 
226 For a discussion of right of reply statutes in the defamation context, see Jerome A. Barron, The Right of 
Reply to the Media in the United States – Resistance and Resurgence, 15 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 1 
(1992).  
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courts should provide services like Avvo with immunity against tort suits stemming from 
unflattering ratings, so long as the defendant offers the poorly rated individual or firm a 
right of reply similar to eBay’s. Such a rule would permit a vendor to point out possible 
biases that formed the basis for an unfair rating.  
 Reputation ratings systems are an alternative to formal adjudication and criminal 
enforcement. In many cases, these systems will provide the most efficient mechanism for 
resolving and deterring disputes. Bringing the complex, slow, and costly legal system 
into run-of-the-mill disputes over whether Tavern on the Green’s décor rating should be a 
24 or a 27, or whether Browne’s attorney score should be a 5.1 or a 6.2 endangers an 
important and dynamic aspect of the nation’s private reputational infrastructure. The 
result of legal liability here for reputation trackers will be fewer ratings, less information 
for consumers, and greater reliance on more problematic bases for deciding upon an 
attorney, like race, limited word-of-mouth data, law school attended, media visibility, 
claims in attorney advertisements, and the like. 
 Of course, removing the possibility of liability in cases where inaccurate feedback 
is reported on a ratings web site creates the potential for the quality of the published 
feedback to suffer, just as eliminating defamation liability might cause the quality of 
newspaper reporting to decline. That said, a decline in quality would by no means be 
inevitable. The question in both cases is whether market forces provide adequate 
incentives to keep the information on reputation rating sites generally accurate. With 
respect to this question, it is appropriate to give a provisional affirmative answer. 
Although there is always the potential for web sites providing biased product reviews to 
receive heavy traffic, that has not happened. Consumer Reports, published by a non-
profit that accepts no advertising from the merchants whose products it reviews, vastly 
outsells Consumer Guide, which is less objective and ad-supported. Search engines that 
auction off the top responses to search queries do not have nearly as many users as those 
that place more popular or more widely linked web pages at the top of their search 
results. U.S. News & World Reports’ rankings of graduate schools and undergraduate 
institutions, flawed though they may be, do not face serious competition from 
publications that sell off top rankings to high bidding universities. To the extent that there 
are variations in the extent to which web sites are objective, web sites that “rate the 
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raters” can point out those web sites that consumers should view with suspicion. There 
are, in short, rather robust mechanisms for promoting accuracy on reputation-rating sites, 
and it seems far from clear that legal liability for potentially erroneous statements would 
be welfare enhancing. 
III. A Normative Framework 
 I hope that careful readers of the preceding parts have not understood me to be a 
cheerleader for the changes that have resulted and will result from the reputation 
revolution. In some cases, the legal challenges posed by new technological capabilities 
are wrenching, and in a few instances those challenges are so severe that they warrant 
restricting the use of the technologies in question. Moreover, because the reputation 
revolution seems poised to create a world that resembles the small towns of yore far more 
than they resemble the urban and suburban environments in which most of us live, 
readers should at least feel uneasy about the process by which we might achieve 
heightened trust, reduced fraud, and decreased statistical discrimination.   
A. Some Thoughts About the Desirability of an Information Strategy 
 I try to limit the normative analysis in my scholarship, and this paper is no 
exception. To be sure, there are places where normative analysis seems appropriate, and I 
apply a rough welfarist cost-benefit analysis in those instances, but my primary objective 
here is to identify the ways in which technological and social developments will alter the 
foundational assumptions upon which the law is based, and then examine how the law 
might respond to those developments. I do so for several reasons, mostly having to do 
with my desire to engage as many readers as possible and help readers with conflicting 
normative priors understand the stakes at issue in particular public policy domains. I am 
not a moral philosopher, let alone a good one, so I see little reason why the reader should 
care about my views on the propriety of various forms of discrimination. 
 At the same time, apparent normative judgments seem to manifest themselves 
throughout this project. For example, I take the position here that some forms of 
discrimination (e.g., statistical discrimination on the basis of race) are particularly 
undesirable and other forms of discrimination (e.g., statistical discrimination manifested 
as an unwillingness to hire ex-offenders, based on the supposition that an ex-offender is 
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probably less trustworthy than an individual with no criminal record) are tolerable. 
Although I do, in fact, believe that discrimination on the basis of race is worse than 
discrimination on the basis of criminal history, it is not those priors that guide my 
analysis here. Rather, my analysis is based on the premise that policymakers in all 
jurisdictions have decided that racial discrimination is unlawful and lawmakers in most 
jurisdictions have concluded that criminal history discrimination is not. I take these 
judgments as a given, noting that nearly a dozen states have limited or even prohibited 
the reliance on prior convictions as a basis for denying employment but that other 
jurisdictions have prohibited ex-felons from working for the state government.227 Once 
we recognize the choice between discrimination on the basis of race and discrimination 
on the basis of criminal history, it is difficult to imagine anyone favoring the former over 
the latter. In our world of imperfect enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, treating all 
forms of discrimination as equally problematic ensures social welfare losses.  
 One useful way of getting at this legal hierarchy issue is through the lens of two 
attributes that are connected, and that plausibly will prompt less consensus among readers 
than the race versus criminal-history distinction. What is worse? Discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation or discrimination on the basis of HIV status? HIV positive 
individuals are protected against discriminatory treatment by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.228 Yet some employers may still prefer to keep HIV-positive individuals 
out of their workplaces, for reasons rational (e.g., concerns about rising group health 
insurance premiums) or irrational (stubborn concerns about the possibility of HIV 
transmission via casual contact). In the United States, the HIV virus historically has been 
disproportionately prevalent among homosexual men, with male-to-male sexual contact 
remaining the predominant method by which HIV positive Americans contracted the 
disease.229  
 Given the substantial stigma associated with HIV and the relatively high costs of 
providing health insurance for HIV-positive employees, it is likely that homosexual men 
                                                 
227 See Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons’ Challenges to 
Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1597, 1637 (2004). 
228 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998). 
229 See Centers for Disease Control, Cases of HIV Infection in the United States and Dependent Areas, 
2005, available at 
<http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2005report/commentary.htm>.  
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are victimized by statistical discrimination designed to keep HIV positive individuals out 
of the work place. One possible strategy for combating this statistical discrimination 
would be to publicize the HIV status of every American. That would be a bad idea. As 
demonstrated by the Americans with Disabilities Act, and a host of common law 
decisions treating HIV status as a “private fact” whose disclosure is highly offensive to a 
reasonable person,230 Americans have decided that HIV status itself ought to be a 
protected classification, and decisions classifying individuals on the basis of HIV status 
may be nearly as bad as decisions classifying them on the basis of race. Indeed, the 
current absence of antidiscrimination protections for homosexuals (at least under federal 
law) suggests that disclosing HIV status to prevent statistical discrimination against gays 
would be undesirable. 
 But suppose a reader believes that the law has it wrong. Perhaps discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation is worse than discrimination against those with HIV on the 
grounds of voluntariness, the centrality of a particular status to identity, historic 
animosity, comparative threats of violence faced, public health considerations, or some 
other basis. As long as the two forms of discrimination are not equally offensive, and the 
other considerations discussed in Part II are satisfied, it would be appropriate, under this 
framework, to publish individuals’ HIV status as a means of alleviating the statistical 
discrimination that HIV-negative, out-of-the-closet gay men currently endure. Indeed, 
perhaps paradoxically, publishing this information might encourage more gay men to 
come out of the closet, which could benefit both homosexuals and heterosexuals. So in a 
world where the law’s present hierarchy of antidiscrimination interests is flipped, 
publishing individuals’ HIV status would make sense.  
 Things would get more complicated if the law decided that all anti-discrimination 
is equally bad. Formally, the law holds that discrimination on the basis of race is 
unlawful regardless of whether the victims are white males or African American females. 
When one looks more closely at the allocation of government and private resources, at 
popular attitudes, and the like, a more nuanced structure emerges. Discrimination on the 
basis of race against African Americans is plainly regarded as worse than discrimination 
                                                 
230 See, e.g., Multimedia, WMAZ v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App. 1994); Hillman v. Columbia 
County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 922 (Wis. 1991). 
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on the basis of race against Caucasians. African Americans and Native Americans are 
given particularly strong protection because of the prevalence and intensity of the historic 
disadvantage that they have faced. Discrimination on the basis of religion is bad, but it 
has not exercised lawmakers or the public nearly to the same extent as discrimination on 
the basis of race. To equate the two forms of discrimination is, as this paper shows, to 
remove an important antidiscrimination tool from the law’s quiver.  
B. Incidence 
 The discussion so far has been premised on the idea that it is desirable to help 
law-abiding African American males at the expense of African American males with 
criminal records. To defend that proposition, it is worth exploring the counterarguments – 
namely, why someone might want to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to 
sort among those with criminal records and those without criminal records. There are 
several possible justifications for this approach. First, we might expect that those with 
criminal records will be harmed more than those without criminal records will be helped. 
Accordingly, facilitating effective private sorting will make the group of job applicants as 
a whole worse off. Second, we might believe that there are powerful policy justifications 
for preventing sorting, perhaps because we believe that criminals who have served their 
time deserve a clean slate. Third, we might believe that the criminal justice system is 
essentially corrupt, in which case facilitating sorting merely enhances the unjust penalties 
meted out by an arbitrary government apparatus. Of these three arguments, only the last 
one has significant force. I will consider them in turn. 
 First, the available empirical evidence suggests that African American males are 
more likely to be hired by firms that conduct criminal background checks than by 
similarly situated firms that do not. Recall that Holzer and his co-authors found that those 
responsible for hiring appeared to overestimate the propensity of African American males 
to have criminal records, and hire too few African Americans as a consequence.231 
Publicizing accurate information about individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice 
system should only adversely affect a group’s available opportunities to the extent that 
decisionmakers (a) underestimate the prevalence of criminal records among members of 
                                                 
231 Holzer et al., supra note 56, at 474. 
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a particular group, or (b) are effectively prevented from engaging in statistical 
discrimination to sort out those with criminal records. The Holzer study undercuts both 
claims in the race-criminal history context. What’s more, it is plausible that 
decisionmakers in employment settings are more risk-averse232 with respect to 
erroneously hiring someone with a criminal background than they are about not hiring 
someone without a criminal background. If decisionmakers are risk averse in that way, 
but they are not particularly risk averse about the prospect of antidiscrimination liability, 
then publicizing information about who has a criminal record may make the group that 
was previously the target of statistical discrimination better off as a whole. To the extent 
that we are concerned about the welfare of a group that is victimized by statistical 
discrimination, we should limit anti-sorting strategies to those settings in which 
employers are engaging in statistical discrimination while at the same time 
underestimating the correlation between a group classification and an undesirable 
characteristic. 
 Alternatively, we might think that private sorting creates negative externalities, 
and justify keeping criminal histories obscure for that reason. For example, we might 
believe on policy grounds that the availability of employment opportunities for ex-cons 
will discourage recidivism. Alternatively, we might have an abstract ideological 
commitment to the proposition that “everyone deserves a second chance,” or, more 
narrowly, that “someone who has served his time has repaid his debt to society and 
should be able to start off with a clean slate.” These sorts of arguments sometimes find 
their way into the information privacy case law233 and academic literature.234 In this case, 
the appropriate question to ask is what is the optimal strategy for preventing these 
negative externalities. The sensible way to answer this question is by drawing on the 
tools of optimal redistribution analysis.  
 It would seem that the best way to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons who deserve a 
second chance is through direct subsidies to employers who hire them. Such programs 
have been implemented, with the discontinued federal Targeted Jobs Tax Credit 
                                                 
232 Strauss, supra note 44, at 1641. 
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providing one example235 and the current federal tax code’s Work Opportunity Credit 
providing another.236 Because it is inexpensive for the government to identify ex-cons, 
the government can efficiently ensure that only genuine ex-cons benefit from the 
subsidized second chances.237 And since the program is funded out of general tax 
revenues, the costs of promoting second chances is borne by taxpayers as a whole. 
Compare that regime to the status quo. We try to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons by 
raising private decisionmakers’ costs of sorting between ex-cons and those with no 
criminal records. As a result, many employers use statistical discrimination tools to 
penalize non-ex-cons, and the ex-cons who do get hired are likely to be members of 
groups whose baseline offending rates are low – white males, and females of all races. 
Under the present system, only some of the beneficiaries of the existing “promote second 
chances through information obscurity” program are actually ex-cons, and the costs of 
this program fall heavily on a group that includes other ex-cons and innocent people who 
share demographic characteristics with ex-cons. From an optimal redistribution 
perspective, there is little reason238 to prefer our present approach to a tax credit?239  
 The final justification for obscuring information about criminal offenses is 
connected to disturbing inequalities within the criminal justice system. More precisely, if 
the criminal justice system is systematically biased against African Americans, Latinos, 
or men, then a system whereby the government publicizes the crimes of African 
Americans, Latinos, and men will worsen existing inequality. This argument comes the 
closest to providing a compelling reason for suppressing criminal history information 
about individuals. If criminal punishments are indeed meted out arbitrarily to members of 
                                                 
235 See George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, 11 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 225, 291-92 (1994). 
236 26 U.S.C. § 51(D)(1)(c).  For an overview of the history of tax credits and other subsidies, see TIMOTHY 
J. BARTICK, JOBS FOR THE POOR: CAN LABOR DEMAND POLICIES HELP? 207-16 (Russell Sage Found. 
2001). 
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Subsidies Increase Employment in Subsidized Firms?, 74 Economica 51, 52, 63-64 (2006). 
238 For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 247-250. 
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supra note 64, at 515.   
 69 of 82  
minority groups, then a Rawlsian should reject the proposal that I have advanced,240 
though a welfarist should not.241 To a Rawlsian, some for of reputational affirmative 
action would be necessary to render a searchlight strategy desirable in the employment of 
ex-cons context.242   
 If we accept a softened version of the “arbitrary criminal justice system” thesis, 
then we certainly need not reject the approach defended here. More precisely, even in a 
nation whose criminal justice system discriminates systematically against African 
American males, there may be important, merit-related differences between those African 
American males who have criminal records and those who do not. Some of the former 
will be innocent, but surely virtually all of the latter will be innocent. Indeed, because the 
criminal justice system is biased against African American males, those African 
American males who nevertheless avoid run-ins with the law should be particularly 
desirable employees in the market for jobs where trustworthiness is important and the 
applicant pool contains a large number of untrustworthy job seekers. Why shouldn’t we 
help decisionmakers identify these particularly desirable individuals with greater ease?  
C. Social Meaning 
 It is possible to critique the optimal redistribution analysis put forth above while 
staying within a welfarist framework. The analysis would proceed as follows: Outright 
prohibitions on discriminatory conduct are preferable to subsidies for non-discriminatory 
conduct because the former will instill or strengthen anti-discrimination norms and the 
latter will not. By this logic, the implementation of prohibitive discrimination policies 
will eventually change the preferences of the populace, making the discriminatory 
                                                 
240 See, e.g., the discussion of the difference principle in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100-102 
(1971). 
241 This discussion also brings to mind a broader question, which is the relationship between the growth of 
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Wealth Without Markets?, 116 Yale L.J. 1472, 1506-09 (2007). 
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impulse rarer in the long run.243 A policy that permits discrimination but subsidizes 
employment of the discriminated-against group, on the other hand, might signal tacit 
approval of the discriminatory conduct at issue, perhaps making discrimination more 
socially acceptable (and hence more prevalent) in the long run.244 
 The story has intuitive appeal, and the hypothesized effect is plausible, but there 
are equally plausible stories we can tell that will drag us in the opposite direction. In 
essence, the social meaning argument for prohibitions on discriminatory conduct is 
analogous to the social meaning argument for command-and-control environmental 
regulation rather than market-based approaches like pollution taxes and tradable 
emissions permits. In that context, Michael Sandel has hypothesized that trying to 
regulate greenhouse gasses through any strategy other than command-and-control will 
weaken environmental norms,245 and I have argued that the available empirical evidence 
suggests precisely the opposite – putting a price tag on something like pollution causes 
individuals to value previously undervalued environmental resources, weakens the 
impetus to flout laws that are perceived to be draconian, and can actually strengthen 
environmental norms.246  
 The question of whether tax subsidies for firms that employ ex-convicts are 
desirable is an empirical one on which there is conflicting evidence. A widely-cited 1985 
study by Gary Burtless suggests that welfare-recipient job seekers whose employment 
was subsidized fared poorly in the labor market, because the presence of the voucher 
signaled employers that the applicants were on welfare, and employers otherwise would 
have had difficulty discerning who was a welfare recipient.247 As a result of this research 
                                                 
243 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 965-67 (1995); Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2026-29 (1996).  
244 It is worth flagging here Christine Jolls’s creative account of how antidiscrimination law might 
undermine implicit bias by increasing the number of minorities in leadership positions, which 
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245 Michael Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23. 
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and important subsequent legal scholarship by Anne Alstott, some legal scholars have 
taken a dim view of targeted tax credits.248 Yet more recent work suggests that the 
program Burtless studied was designed so as to maximize the welfare stigma,249 and that 
well-designed tax incentives to employ disadvantaged workers can be effective at 
increasing their employment.250 And perhaps more to the point, Burtless, Alstott, and 
other contributors to this field have not explored the troubling possibility that in the 
absence of a tax subsidy program that helps employers sort between the disadvantaged 
and the non-disadvantaged, employers instead sort between the white and black.  
 A final, and related question concerns the social meaning of government 
information policy. When the government chooses to publish information about attribute 
A but not attribute B, the populace may understand this policy as an indication that 
attribute A is relevant or salient but attribute B is not.251 This is part of a plausible critique 
of Megan’s Laws, which disclose information about sex offenders’ criminal histories and 
whereabouts without disclosing the same information about murderers who have 
completed their sentences, causing communities to over-react to the presence of some ex-
offenders and under-react to the presence of others.252 The theoretically attractive 
solution to this problem is to release as much information as possible, relying on private 
actors to distill this information into a format that consumers can use readily. 
D. Price Discrimination 
 The greater availability of consumers’ personal information enables forms of 
price discrimination that would not have been feasible prior to the reputation revolution. 
Price discrimination can take multiple forms, but the classic example is of “a firm 
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charging multiple prices for the same good where the difference in price is not 
attributable to a corresponding difference in cost.”253 To take a short-lived but notorious 
example, Amazon.com began using information from Internet cookies to engage in 
dynamic pricing: Loyal customers who frequently bought from Amazon were charged 
higher prices and customers who were directed to Amazon from comparison-shopping 
web sites were charged less.254 Amazon dropped the practice in the face of significant 
customer complaints.255 Yet, Amazon’s reliance on proxies like repeat purchases or use 
of a bargain-hunting web site necessarily entails lumping together groups of consumers – 
a practice that the economics literature refers to as third-degree price discrimination.256 
Amazon could extract much more consumer surplus if it was able to charge prices that 
perfectly reflected each consumer’s willingness to pay for a product – what economists 
call first-degree price discrimination.257 Put another way, in the absence of perfect 
information about every individual, price discriminating firms are required to statistically 
discriminate in their pricing policies. 
 The widespread availability of personal information about individuals’ behaviors, 
preferences, and reputations enables firms to shift toward behavior that more closely 
approximates first-degree price discrimination.258 Provided that selling firms have some 
market power, can limit arbitrage, and are marketing to consumers possessing varied 
price elasticities of demand, price discrimination will enable those firms to capture what 
would otherwise be consumer welfare under a fixed pricing model.259 
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 Price discrimination is prohibited by law only where it adversely affects consumer 
welfare.260 This is as it should be: The effects of price discrimination, unlike the effects 
of racial discrimination, are ambiguous. Perfect first-degree price discrimination will 
enable a firm to increase output, improving social welfare, but at the cost of a diversion 
of surplus from consumers to producers.261 The welfare effects of third-degree price 
discrimination are quite context-dependent, by contrast.262 Moreover, even the 
distributional consequences of price discrimination are indeterminate. While price 
discrimination necessarily shifts surplus away from consumers, it also enables poor 
consumers who would otherwise be unable to afford a product the opportunity to obtain it 
(at a reduced price.) For that reason, price discrimination often entails a progressive 
redistribution of resources.263 In short, the desirability of price discrimination is 
ultimately an empirical question with varied answers in different contexts. Sometimes, 
the existing empirical work suggests that the benefits of price discrimination outweigh 
the harms.264 We simply do not know the welfare or distributional consequences of 
facilitating price discrimination in e-commerce generally, in landlord-tenant markets, in 
immigration decisionmaking, or in most of the other settings that I discuss herein. But we 
do know that price discrimination considerations should be an essential part of the 
calculus in determining when search lights or curtains are desirable.  
E. The “Am I Hot or Not?” Society 
 In October of 2000, James Hong launched a strange new web site called 
www.amihotornot.com.265 In the web site’s first month of operation, more than 20,000 
individuals submitted photographs (of themselves, typically) to the web site so that other 
users could rate their physical attractiveness on a scale of 1 to 10.266 Although many 
Americans scratched their heads about the web site’s success, the site was a viral hit with 
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teenagers and young adults, and remains online and popular today, though it has morphed 
into some combination of a beauty rating site and an Internet dating site.267  
 In the intervening years, cultural trends have suggested at least a limited embrace 
of the rate-me-mentality exemplified by amihotornot. Millions of Americans have begun 
blogging about their personal thoughts, sharing their homemade videos on Youtube, and 
dreaming about competing on American Idol, which is in the midst of a strong run as the 
most popular television show in the United States. Not long before a scandal involving a 
referee’s alleged involvement in game-fixing, N.B.A. Commission David Stern bragged 
that professional basketball referees were the “most ranked, rated, reviewed, statistically 
analyzed, and mentored group of employees of any company in any place in the 
world.”268 Those of us in the academy can relate to these referees, as we have come to 
expect that our teaching will be evaluated by students at the end of a course and perhaps 
via web sites like ratemyprofessor.com. And, of course, our writing will be evaluated by 
tenure committees, lateral search committees at competitor schools, and, inevitably, 
workshop attendees. Being evaluated unfavorably always stings, but one premise of this 
paper is that being evaluated unfavorably on the basis of individuated criteria stings less, 
and is less socially harmful, than being evaluated unfavorably on the basis of membership 
in a protected group.269    
 What are the effects of this observation on people? There is a slowly growing 
empirical literature that addresses this question. Employees in many industries face 
constant evaluation by co-workers, customers, and supervisors, and sociologists have 
explored the effects of being a call center employee whose actions are constantly under 
surveillance. Insofar as business-related calls were being monitored and recorded, they 
prompted little employee resistance.270 Similarly, when researchers at Stanford began 
studying the effects of publishing feedback generated by speed-dating encounters 
                                                 
267 See http://www.hotornot.com/pages/faq.html#faq1 (visited Aug. 8, 2007). 
268 Alan Schwarz & William K. Rashbaum, Referee is the Focus of a Federal Inquiry, N.Y. Times, July 21, 
2007, at D1. 
269 That is the basic intuition behind heightened penalties for hate crimes. 
270 Employees were more concerned about management unintentionally listening to personal calls.  See 
Gloria Lakshear et al., Call Center Employees’ Responses to Electronic Monitoring: Some Research 
Findings, 15 Work, Employment & Soc’y 595, 601-04 (2001). 
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between opposite sex experiment subjects, they found some surprising results.271 The 
researchers matched up pairs of people and asked them to provide feedback about their 
fellow research subject’s behavior in the speed-dating exercise. In some variations, the 
feedback was kept private, and in other circumstances, each partner’s feedback about the 
other partner was publicized. Moreover, in some variations, the feedback included 
substantive comments, whereas in other variations it consisted entirely of numerical 
scoring.272 Participants were asked to assess the extent to which they felt monitored, 
conformist, and self-conscious in the various experimental set-ups. They reported that 
having numerical feedback about them made public, but without any basis for the 
feedback, felt most invasive, most conformist, and made them most-self conscious.273 
Feedback that was shared with both parties was more acceptable to everyone, and 
numerical feedback accompanied by substantive explanations for the scores was viewed 
as far more acceptable than numerical feedback alone.274 If this result is broadly 
generalizable, and some research in very different contexts suggests at least parts of it 
may be, 275 then it suggests that ordinary people may be willing to embrace ubiquitous 
feedback systems, provided they are sufficiently transparent and universal.  
 There is, of course, an important difference between the amihotornot submitters, 
small-town residents, call center employees, speed daters, referees, and professors whose 
activities are evaluated frequently, and those whose activities are rarely, if ever, subject to 
evaluations. The difference is consent. For the reasons identified above, the option of 
removing one’s self from the reputation nation will be more of a theoretical possibility 
than a practical one. If an individual chooses to opt out of using reputation-tracking 
technologies, then many people understandably will assume the worst about that 
individual.276 Privacy theorists have long argued that protecting privacy is essential so 
                                                 
271 Eric Ann Robles et al., Being Watched or Being Special: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
Being Monitored, Surveilled, and Assessed, CHI 2006 Proceedings – Privacy 2, at 831, 833-35 (2006). 
272 Id. at 833-34. 
273 Id. at 836-37. 
274 Id. at 837. 
275 See, e.g., Steve Mann et al. , Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data 
Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 Surveillance & Soc’y 331, 346-47 (2003). 
276 This account helps explain why even people with poorer-than-average reputations would continue to 
opt-in to the system.  Participation would provide a means for such an individual to separate himself from 
those with horrendous reputations.  Even people whose reputational profiles include horrendous past acts 
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that individuals can relax,277 experiment with different personalities to figure out who 
they truly are,278 or develop the insights that will make them more productive citizens.279 
True enough, the private sphere of the home will remain a respite largely free of rating, 
and there will be market demand for zones of privacy where everyone will agree to 
suspend the use of rating technologies – it is easy to imagine the proprietors of the Las 
Vegas strip going this route, though it seems likely that they would first establish 
minimum reputational requirements for entry into the reputation-free zone. The question, 
though, is whether those zones of privacy are sufficient to prevent the societal harms to 
which privacy theorists have pointed. In line with the peculiarities of Americans’ 
attitudes toward privacy generally,280 and the well-recognized dangers of surveillance in 
one-party states,281 the answer may well hinge on the extent to which the state can be 
prevented from utilizing widely available personal information to identify, intimidate, or 
otherwise disfavor members and supporters of the political opposition. 
IV. Conclusion  
 The technological tools that can curtail anonymity and obscurity in the public 
sphere already exist or will soon exist. During the next decade, the collectivity of 
consumers will get to decide whether and to what extent to accept these technologies. 
The analysis in this paper is premised on the intuition that such technologies will be 
embraced by consumers to a substantial degree, but there is another way to read this 
paper. My argument here can also be read as an exploration of some of the unrecognized 
costs and benefits that will flow from enhanced reputational infrastructure. The reputation 
revolution envisioned here ought to cause us to revise our thinking about much of the 
law, and this paper has identified some of the challenges that it will pose for property 
law, antidiscrimination law, health law, insurance law, immigration law, and consumer 
protection law. That list is by no means meant to be exhaustive, and one ambition of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
might still have some incentive to improve their reputation in the future, so as to separate themselves from 
the unredeemable sociopaths at the very bottom of the reputation hierarchy. 
277 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
278 Cohen, supra note 17, at 1373. 
279 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38-78 (1958). 
280 See Whitman, supra note 103, at 1151. 
281 See, e.g., The Lives of Others (Sony Pictures 2006), a movie that Netflix users, quite sensibly, loved. 
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paper is to encourage readers to assess how other bodies of law might need to be revised 
and reassessed in light of possibly looming technological developments.  
 Readers might take any number of points away from the preceding discussion, but 
let me conclude by underscoring the ones that strike me as the most important. First and 
foremost, information policy is an underutilized and undertheorized tool for the state to 
influence the behavior of private parties. This paper has suggested that there will be 
settings in which the government can reduce the prevalence of unlawful discrimination 
by publicizing previously private information about individuals. For example, the best 
available empirical evidence suggests that publicizing criminal history information could 
reduce racial discrimination in the employment of blue collar and service workers. 
Pushing the point further, the paper wonders whether a similar strategy might reduce the 
prevalence of statistical discrimination in the prescription of narcotics and the pricing of 
automobile insurance premiums. At the same time, the paper reminds us of the pitfalls of 
this strategy in instances where government research into individuals’ backgrounds and 
subsequent dissemination of the information gleaned might prompt segments of the 
populace to rely on undesirable self-help strategies. Jury duty may well be one such 
context. Government information policy also may be a poor strategy in those settings 
where irrational discrimination is more prevalent than rational discrimination, where 
traditional law enforcement deters discrimination quite well, or where there are 
significant social benefits that arise when the poor treatment of secretly privileged people 
sparks a useful debate on matters of distributive justice. 
 Second, optimal public policy design must take account of the availability of a 
private market for reputation information. In regulating the landlord-tenant market, pro-
tenant reformers’ failed to anticipate the reputational repercussions of insisting on 
summary proceedings as the sole avenue for evicting tenants. In the immigration context, 
a comparative analysis of reputational infrastructure in the developed and developing 
world demonstrates the possible appeal of a bifurcated immigration policy – one that 
focuses on pre-entry-screening for residents of developed nations and post-entry-
surveillance for residents of nations with poor reputation infrastructures. And in the 
consumer protection sector, blindness to the benefits of reputation monitoring services 
might render the law too quick to encourage private litigation and (more ominously) too 
 78 of 82  
eager to impose liability on valuable services that provides cheaper, more efficient, and 
maybe even more satisfying mechanisms for resolving and deterring garden-variety 
disputes. The law must not impose defamation liability on reputation rating sites without 
first exploring the powerful social and technological correctives that may be better suited 
to the reputation rating world than they were to the traditional print and broadcast media.   
 Third, and finally, the reputation revolution presents a number of thorny tradeoffs 
that legal scholars and policymakers should begin to discuss. Should society create a 
hierarchy of unlawful discrimination, so that it tolerates government actions that reduce 
race discrimination by facilitating, say, employment status discrimination? What effects 
will information-based government antidiscrimination policies have on related social 
norms? Can a society obtain the benefits of substantial coveillance (private citizens 
watching each other, and disclosing what they see) without encountering the threats that 
arise from excessive surveillance (the state watching its citizens)?282 These are pressing 
questions without obvious answers, and this paper has sketched out some initial 
responses.  
 While many readers will recoil instinctively at some of the scenarios described 
herein, this paper has tried to add texture to the imminent debate over these issues by 
asking whether we might also want to recoil at some of the pathologies generated by 
environments in which individual reputation information is in short supply. Most of us 
live in such an environment, though that is changing quickly, and as a consequence we 
seem to have more unlawful employment discrimination than is necessary, more distrust 
between doctors and patients than is appropriate, immigration policies that are less 
sensible than they should be, and dispute resolution procedures for garden-variety 
disagreements that are more cumbersome and frustrating than they ought to be.  
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